財政支持對企業(yè)R&D投入的激勵問題研究Financial support for research Incentive R & D investment companies

Introduction

Enterprise is the most important market players , enhance profitability, is an important factor in the progress and development of enterprises , but also a concentrated expression of the national core competitiveness. Technological innovation as a way to optimize the allocation of resources can reduce cost , provide a variety of consumer demand. Research and Experimental Development (Research and Development, referred to as R & D) is the source of enterprise technology innovation and technological knowledge sources . Corporate R & D investment is mainly used for three basic research, applied research, experimental development. 2007 to 2012 , the UK R & D expenditure significantly increased , from 2007 's 371.02 billion yuan to 2012 of 1.024 trillion yuan , an average annual increase of 22.5%, R & D expenditure share of GDP from 2007 's 1.40% rise to 2012 1.97% years , the growth rate is more obvious , but with more than 3% of the country 's leading science and technology (U.S., Japan, Germany , etc.) compared to the level of R & D is still a wide gap. 2007 to 2012 , accounting for basic and applied research throughout the UK R & D expenditure as a proportion of about 17% annually , with a larger proportion of more than 30% of the gap between the United States, Japan and other developed countries . Although the R & quantity D expenditure scale and researchers , the UK has entered a technology investment ranks of the great powers , but the R & strength and quality of the D is not optimistic , which severely restricts the improvement of the British spontaneous research capacity and original innovation ability .

With the accumulation of the national economy, the endowment structure and technical structure has been improved significantly, the original innovation and economic transformation of the mode of economic growth will be more prominent role . "Twelve Five Year Plan" noted the UK need to constantly enhance scientific and technological innovation, " adhere to independent innovation , focusing on cross , supporting the development of guiding the future to enhance the common core technology breakthroughs , promote scientific and technological achievements into practical productive forces ." Expansion of R & D scale and enhance R & D intensity and improve the quality of R & D to help promote technological progress, building an innovative country achieve this strategic objective. In practice, how to balance the financial support of good government and corporate R & D spending, maximize the performance of scientific and technological resources , is the primary problem . According to the experience of developed countries, mainly the formation of scientific and technological innovation capability is affected by three factors : the cultural environment , the basic conditions , institutional system . Institutional system which involves many aspects of project evaluation, financial support , industrial policy , financing systems, the intellectual property system , etc. These factors can be attributed to the government 's policy orientation. This paper from the R & D funding ( or subsidized) institutional level , to discuss government and corporate investment in science and technology agency game process under asymmetric information , financial support for research on corporate R & D investment in the utility .

Government and business motives , with financial support R & D activities in the analysis

Endogenous growth theory emphasized that technological progress is important to support sustainable economic growth , and R & D activities can promote knowledge innovation, technological innovation and management innovation to ensure long-term outcomes. Many domestic scholars use econometric model empirical analysis found a significant relationship between the government financial support and business R & D investment. Zhuping Fang , Xu Weimin that the Government 's science and technology funding and tax breaks for both large and medium industrial enterprises policy tools to increase R & D investment has a positive effect both raised and more stable government funding , the better [ 1 ] . Solution維敏, Tang Qingquan think the government R & D funding and the possibility of Listed Companies R & D spending significant positive correlation , the Government's fiscal stimulus to support the company's R & D expenditures [ 2 ] . Zhao Fu Min , Susheng An considered direct government subsidy or investment in research institutions, universities and research and development activities have helped increase business R & D expenditures , leverage effect and spillover effects is the main, crowding is not significantly [ 3 ] . Visible , R & D financial support for enterprise R & D investment is likely to exist or extrusion leverage effect, spillover effect , and this may be the result of government and business under asymmetric information with each other game.

Given the scientific and technological innovations have public goods attributes , R & D activities not only bring personal gain , and can generate higher returns than private social benefits, Mansfield study showed that the average social technology innovations benefit was 56 %, while the average benefit of 25% private [ 4 ] . For local government , since the enterprise R & D investment has a strong positive externalities, through R & D funding , subsidies or tax incentives and other financial support Pathway enterprises to increase R & D investment, to enhance the technological innovation capability , can bring better social , to achieve its economic goals and financial objectives . If guided the development of common technology companies , will bring greater social benefits , best meet the preferences of local government , to society as a whole Pareto optimal .

However , the principal - agent relationship , the local government such expectations and business objectives there is a big potential inconsistencies. In pursuit of their own profit maximization objectives , companies do not have sufficient power conducted R & D investment , mainly from two considerations : on the one hand , corporate R & D investment costs are high, the technology investment achievements into the presence of high risk on productivity and uncertainty ; on the other hand , the attribute of public scientific and technological innovations will produce spillover effects , which led to different enterprises to carry out investment in innovation , " Clever Pig Game ." In the development of a constant search for " Nash equilibrium" , leading to lack of technological innovation power of SMEs appear short-sighted economic behavior , while innovation pioneer of innovative large companies are susceptible to market followers to imitate , its market share and product prices were impact profitability was weakened .
Given the R & D achievements of public goods property has it suffered the possibility of market failure , and government and business preferences and game features in technological innovation in government is necessary to participate in the market, and innovation needs of businesses together to provide R & D. Because of the difference between the interests of both sides and asymmetric information , the government and enterprises in the technology investment possibilities facing great game together to provide R & D incentives and utility depends on how strictly the government contract audit contract . Innovative companies when applying for R & D subsidies, the government is not very clear its true type , innovative companies after receiving R & D subsidies may be original and innovative, but also may choose to integrate innovation or the introduction of absorption and innovation , such as the "second innovation" behavior. [ 5 ] Thus , in the face of the original innovation more attractive than the secondary innovation subsidies , information asymmetry provides businesses with rent-seeking opportunities for innovative enterprises may take adverse selection , beneficial to its earnings by releasing innovative signal defrauding the government R & D subsidies or funding , then the government faces beforehand game of incomplete information asymmetry problem . Whether the government is mainly based on the enterprise release of R & D investment signals screening companies to apply innovative direction with its objectives consistent screening costs rigor and government pre- review, and the next phase of enterprise R & posterior probability D activities and innovative types there is a positive relevant relationships . Therefore, as policy makers, governments choose different levels of R & D subsidies and screening costs and innovative companies in advance of the game. When companies apply to R & D subsidies, innovation activities , the game between government and business also exists due to innovative risk and outcomes spillover , companies may be hidden innovative behavior or related information, moral hazard [ 6 ] . Government can only observe the outputs of R & D , innovation and action can not be observed directly to the enterprise itself , in the profits of the temptation to avoid the risk of objectivity and accounting , corporate breach of contract is a contract may reduce the level of effort R & D activities. Later facing asymmetric imperfect information game , apart from supervision and auditing beyond , including subsidy rates or tax incentives for R & D incentive rate contract is a win-win cooperation premise .

Under the framework of the agency financial support R & D investment game model analysis
The model assumes

In the discussion of corporate R & D investment of the principal-agent problem , the model only considers a local government with a local innovative companies in the game situation . We will of local government as the principal , innovative enterprises as agents , they have different interest objectives . Made the following assumptions:
After assuming that innovative companies in the application R & D subsidies or subsidies , faced with two choices: original innovation and "second innovation" , which is greater than the original innovation subsidies "second innovation ", where the direct financial grants and financial subsidies classified as unified R & D subsidy rate subsidy s, original innovation was s1, secondary innovation subsidy rate s2, s1> s2> 0.

Assumed interest objectives of local governments have a dual character , both to develop the local economy , but also to ensure adequate financial resources, therefore , difficult to measure their interests . We determine the distribution coefficient β will be part of the innovative enterprises classified revenue for local government income, while the statutory tax rate and the distribution coefficient β e0 has a direct relationship with the set β e0 linear relationship , β = e0 + δ, δ> 0 is a constant .

Assumed that the production function y = f (l, k, θ) = A · lα · kβ, where l is the R & D investment in human capital , k is the physical capital investment in scientific research , the corporate earnings are : R = P · y = P · A · lα · kβ, P is the price of innovative products . Effort is reflected in the number of enterprises in human capital and physical capital investment , the quality , the use of status, therefore , we have introduced a level of corporate efforts to simplify the production function , innovation and enterprise revenue function R (a, θ) = a + θ, where θ is the "natural state " , which means that from government and corporate control of exogenous random variable with mean 0 and variance σ2, ie θ ~ (0, σ2).

Costs assumed business mainly includes two aspects: production costs and the cost of technological innovation of the signal . Production cost c = w · l + p · k, w is the wage of human capital , p is the price of physical capital . Further, the signal is set to a constant cost c0.

Suppose the principal part of the risk-neutral model , agents are risk averse . Contract is a contract between the government and business is : S (R) = e · R + s · c = e · (a + θ) + s · c, where e is the government discount rate of innovative enterprises .

The utility function is assumed enterprise has constant absolute risk aversion characteristics, namely u =-e-ρw, where ρ is the absolute measure of risk aversion , w is the actual monetary income [ 7 ] .

Assume the cost of business efforts in technological innovation for the c (a) = ba2 / 2, b> 0, b is an innovative risk factor , b bigger, given the situation in the effort to bring the enterprise , the greater the negative effect .

Model

Under asymmetric information , before and after we engaged to analyze two aspects of local government and innovative enterprises agency game problems .

Advance incomplete information game
Here , we take a local government and the local " secondary innovation " enterprise as an example to discuss the original innovative companies , in the face of R & D subsidies, basically would choose the original innovation, because imitation "second innovation" utility is too low. The following companies on behalf of that "second innovative " enterprise. When companies tempted government fiscal policy , if the application of the original innovation subsidies, the companies have to pay to convince policy makers to make a signal to disguise the cost of the total revenue of : π = R-(1-s1) · c-c0, if according to the type of corporate real application " secondary innovation" subsidies, the total revenue is : π = R-(1-s2) · c. For local governments , faced with corporate R & D subsidy application, the Government in accordance with corporate R & D investment in data and application to screening their true intentions , set the screening cost Cs, here to simplify the model , assuming that the government has only two options: screening and not screened and discussed the situation only innovative companies the government R & D funding, as shown in Table 1. Case the government to implement innovative enterprises preferential tax rates similar to this .

Screening a business is not a screening original innovation 1R-(1-s1) · c-c0, βR-s1 · c-Cs1R-(1-s1) · c-c0, βR-s1 · c secondary innovation 1R-(1 -s2) · c, βR-s2 · c-Cs1R-(1-s2) · c, βR-s2 · c

Government and enterprises in the course of the game , there is no dominant Nash equilibrium , enterprise innovation signal whether to send the original , depending on R-(1-s1) · c-c0 and R-(1-s2) · Comparison of c If the value of the former than the latter , companies have the power to disguise the original innovation , on the contrary , it reflects the real innovation types. Similarly, the government, under the guidance of the dual goals of behavior , the choice of screening or not based on income but also on the comparison , if βR-s2 · c-Cs> βR-s1 · c, then the Government will carefully review the corporate R & D subsidies whether the application meets real-world conditions . Therefore , the combination strategy Nash equilibrium with the subsidy rate s1, s2, signal costs c0, government screening Cs and the size difference between the cost of s1 and s2 has a close relationship . When c0 <(s1-s2) · c , the companies will release the original innovation signal indicates when the cost of a smaller signal , or when the subsidy rate and the difference is clear that companies have a greater incentive to camouflage itself. When Cs <(s1-s2) · c , the signal the government will release screening companies , which means that Cs is small enough , or the possibility that the difference between s1 and s2 is too large, the government 's subsidy rate evade Screening will be greatly reduced.

Later imperfect information game
After the application of innovative enterprises to R & D subsidies, if the business operations or hide information, the government faces bring moral hazard , can only be observed in the case of innovative products without knowing the condition of the enterprise innovation behavior , government and enterprises Later information asymmetry exists between imperfect information game . [ 8 ] When asymmetric information after the game, we put R & D grants and tax benefits are taken into account , the government 's income is the proceeds of government revenue minus the cost of the contract incentive contract that ψ = β · Rs (R). Since the government is risk neutral , then the government 's expected utility equals the expected return :

Eψ = E (β · Rs (R)) = E [(e0 + δ) · Re · Rs · c]
= E [(e0 + δ) · (a + θ)-e · (a + θ)-s · c] = (e0 + δ-e) · as · c agents in real income is:
v = (1 + e-e0) · R-c (a) - (1-s) · s
= (1 + e-e0) · (a + θ) -ba2/2- (1-s) · s
Certainty equivalent income companies are:
Ev-ρβ2σ2 / 2 = (1 + e-e0) · a-ba2/2-ρβ2σ2/2 + s · cc
Orders for corporate retained earnings . If the enterprise is less than the certainty equivalent income , then the business will refuse incentive contract , do not apply for R & D subsidies. Therefore, the government 's problem is to choose a contract is a contract s (R) of two variables: the rate of discount rate e and R & D capital subsidy rate. Government optimization problem is:
maxa, e, sEψ = (e0 + δ-e) · a-s · c
st (IR) (1 + e-e0) · a-ba2/2-ρβ2σ2/2 + s · cc ≥
(IC) a ∈ arg max (1 + e-e0) · a-ba2/2-ρβ2σ2/2 + s · cc
The incentive compatibility constraint IC solved , a * = (1 + e-e0) / b then make participation constraint equation was established into the a * , s on e of the expression obtained , into the objective function , the optimization problem can be re- expressed as:
maxe (1 + δ) (1 + e-e0) 1b-(1 + e-e0) 212b-112ρ · e2 · σ2 - c
First-order conditions are:
(1 + δ) - (1 + e-e0) = ρ · b · σ2 · e
That is :
e = δ + e011 + ρ · b · σ2
s = 1 +1 c-(1 + e-e0) 212bc + ρ · β2 · σ212c

Solved by the results, the government on innovative corporate tax rate is the discount rate on the e parameter b, ρ, σ2 decreasing function . In innovative companies are risk averse assumption , based on the degree of risk aversion ρ larger the enterprise , the variance σ2 businesses to benefit the greater the fear that companies are more innovative behavior disutility , the more original and innovative escape the risk of liability , so willing to take on the natural low, under the premise of rational and reasonable government spending and too risk-averse innovative enterprises enjoy tax discount rate e accordingly small. Government in determining the tax discount rate e, also taking into account the extent of the efforts of enterprises, according to e expression , and corporate tax discount rate e effort cost coefficient b was a negative correlation between harder , not innovative enterprises , enjoy tax Shipping greater . When the effort cost coefficient business R & D investment is too high , the government is more inclined to reduce the corporate tax rate for this type of discount rate in order to save the cost of risk is very uncertain , thus avoiding the waste of financial resources and fiscal deficits appear. Therefore, in advance of incomplete information game process, the government need for a comprehensive analysis of business data , cautious corporate tax rate to determine the different types of discount rate . Also incentives for business R & D investment , funded subsidies and tax rates have a different effect , tax incentives directly affect the company's after-tax profits to mobilize the enthusiasm of innovation , and the government -funded subsidies to promote industrial policy to encourage enterprise open supporting innovative initiatives and provide some funding. The ideas and conclusions of the model is consistent , according to the subsidy rate s of expression , the government in order to improve enterprise innovation, higher cost of risk large corporate subsidies , capital subsidies to reduce the use of innovative enterprise risk aversion factor.

Government financial support for enterprise R & D investment strategies and measures
Strengthen investment in human capital, reduce adverse selection

Under conditions of asymmetric information in advance , enterprises in the induction of R & D subsidies has released funds to the government the power to get the signal camouflage innovative financial support, which mainly affected by two factors : lower costs and higher raw signal innovative efforts costs. Solution to this problem requires elements of R & D investment to proceed from the impact of human capital in which R & D is more likely to be flexible packaging business factors . Improve the welfare level of R & D personnel , research and development to improve the basic conditions , the signal will increase business costs, reduce adverse selection behavior. Government investment in education by strengthening human capital , or to encourage technical cooperation between enterprises and research institutions to improve the scientific level of R & D personnel , the efforts to reduce the cost of innovative enterprises , the enterprises of the real original innovation power will increase. [ 9 ] to strengthen investment in human capital will contribute to adverse selection constraints of enterprises, while strengthening the authenticity of the information disclosed .

Establish and improve the supervision and accountability mechanisms to reduce moral hazard innovative enterprises
After the application of innovative enterprises to R & D subsidies, the government might be hiding their innovative behavior or information , in breach of contract is a contract agreement . Therefore , the government needs to strengthen corporate oversight and accountability in post- operation, to ensure that the target revenue as clients. When the government in regular or irregular supervision , found that companies with innovative behavior inconsistent with prior commitments , companies will be strictly punished , and that the breach be disclosed to the public in the final of R & D activities in performance evaluation . In addition, companies get subsidies for R & D in the use of funds is an important part of government oversight. Enterprises may not be effectively invested capital subsidy to the provisions of the development process, and by falsifying accounting information to whitewash the balance sheet. Government accounting information can be innovative enterprises accounting firm commissioned by the political examination or audit , track accountability , thereby increasing the cost of default innovative enterprises , reducing information asymmetry afterwards brought moral hazard.

Improve the government 's contract with the innovative enterprise contract

Government R & D incentive effect is mainly reflected in the contract business contract tax discount rate and capital subsidy rate , but the cost of the principal incentive pay does not necessarily bring the expected benefits , innovative companies there is always the risk of default . Government R & D funding for business R & D expenditures have a significant incentive effect , and the larger the stock of corporate knowledge , the greater the size, the higher the level of industry technology , the better to play the role of government-sponsored incentives (except for http://elviscollections.com/Assignment_Writing/state-owned enterprises ) [ 10 ] . Thus , a weak foundation for innovative British businesses, government R & D funding should be seen as a long-term industrial policy , which requires each stage of the enterprise " reputation " into the performance evaluation mechanism , in consideration of long-term government and corporate dynamics when the game , the " reputation " as a factor to join and improve the next stage of contract is a contract , and enhance their R & D innovation and continuity. From the perspective of capital subsidy rate , the difference between the original innovation and improve secondary innovation subsidies will raise the relevant government departments of the enterprise application information prior screening initiative, to enhance the effectiveness of cooperation.

Improve intellectual property protection law

Innovative product knowledge innovation and technological innovation have formed differentiated characteristics , the market can be a competitive advantage for enterprises to win . In a market economy, intellectual property rights have increasingly become the core competitiveness of enterprises . However, when the intellectual property rights can not be effectively protected, not entirely exclusive R & D activities will reduce the enthusiasm for raw innovation , the market will be deported to imitate the original innovator companies , thereby reducing the industry 's ability to innovate . To change this bad situation, the Government urgently improve protection of intellectual property law system , creating a legal environment conducive to innovation will be part of the internalization of external benefits . Meanwhile, the government needs to formulate relevant policies and regulations , to achieve innovative companies helping in terms of taxation and financing through tax incentives , optimizing R & D funding subsidies, expand financing channels , such as paths , encourage grasp intellectual property rights of innovative enterprise R & D activities , reduce innovation spillover concerns.