經(jīng)濟學(xué)Essay模板：Government Guided Growth: The Industrialization of South Korea

本文是經(jīng)濟學(xué)專業(yè)的留學(xué)生Essay范例，題目是“Government Guided Growth: The Industrialization of South Korea（政府導(dǎo)向型增長:韓國的工業(yè)化）”,韓國政府是如何塑造韓國的工業(yè)化的?韓國政府實施干涉主義政策和改革，以促進(jìn)出口導(dǎo)向型工業(yè)化。在20世紀(jì)初，朝鮮帝國是一個以農(nóng)業(yè)為主的國家。在日本吞并朝鮮(1910-1945年)期間，日本外務(wù)省官員小松綠道(Komatsu Midori)描述了他的親身經(jīng)歷，他說:“真正意義上的商業(yè)在(韓國)并不存在?！边@個國家僅存的人類活動分支是農(nóng)業(yè)”(Midori)。

How did the South Korean government shape the industrialization of Korea?

The South Korean government implemented interventionist policies and reforms to promote export-oriented industrialization.

In the early 1900s, the Joseon Empire of Korea was deeply agrarian. Komatsu Midori, an official of the Japanese foreign ministry during the Japanese annexation of Korea (1910-1945), described his first hand experiences, stating that "commerce in its true sense did not exist in [Korea]. The only branch of human activity remaining in the country was agriculture" (Midori).

Because South Korean history in the 20th century was one wrought with political strife and warfare that interrupted and destroyed their attempts at development and modernization, South Korea's industrial state remained relatively unchanged after World War ⅠⅠ. Indeed, South Korea was one of the world's poorest countries until the 1960s (Park and Ok 203), lacking both domestic capital and the natural resources necessary to attract foreign investors ("The Korean Economy … "). However, in less than a century, South Korea was able to miraculously transition from a developing state with minimal production and commerce (Cetin and Karadas 93) to the economic powerhouse it is today (Lew and Im).

Surmounting all odds, South Korea grew at an average annual growth rate of 9% between the 1960's - 1990s with a hundredfold increase in per capita income. For this reason, historians call this period of rapid growth and industrialization The Miracle on the Han (Lew and Im). During this time, the South Korean government implemented interventionist policies and reforms to promote export-oriented industrialization that caused South Korea's extraordinary boom in economic growth.

韓國克服重重困難，在20世紀(jì)60年代至90年代期間以年均9%的速度增長，人均收入增長了100倍。因此，歷史學(xué)家們把這段快速發(fā)展和工業(yè)化的時期稱為“漢人的奇跡”。在此期間，韓國政府實施干涉主義政策和改革，促進(jìn)出口導(dǎo)向型工業(yè)化，導(dǎo)致韓國經(jīng)濟增長異常繁榮。

The first important form of government intervention was Land Reform on agricultural land during the early years of the presidency of Syngman Rhee (1948 to 1960). Until then, South Korea had a land tenure system, where in 1930, 77.5% of farmers were tenants who paid up to 60% of their annual crop yields to mostly absentee landlords, or yangban, who controlled around two thirds of total farmland (Shin 14). The tenure system caused the formation of a very small wealthy aristocracy, the yangban, but kept the majority of the population in a cycle of chronic poverty as subsistence farmers, burdened by hefty rent and taxes.

Complete lack of expendable income for most of the population inhibited social mobility and economic diversification, especially since very few rural families could send their children to school or spend money on anything but food and basic necessities. The system also limited agricultural production as there was no incentive for tenant farmers to be more efficient by increasing input supply or improving technology (Shin 15) as only the absentee landlords would reap the benefits. The faulty system persisted during the Japanese occupation because the yangban would inevitably have surplus crops which the Japanese authorities wanted to import.

大多數(shù)人口完全缺乏可支出的收入，這阻礙了社會流動性和經(jīng)濟多樣化，特別是因為很少有農(nóng)村家庭能送孩子上學(xué)，或花錢買食物和基本必需品以外的任何東西。該制度也限制了農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)，因為沒有激勵佃農(nóng)通過增加投入供應(yīng)或改進(jìn)技術(shù)來提高效率(申15)，只有不在的地主才能獲得好處。這個錯誤的制度在日本占領(lǐng)期間一直存在，因為兩班不可避免地會有多余的作物，日本當(dāng)局想要進(jìn)口。

At the beginning of Rhee's presidency, urgent reforms were called for and procured in the form of the Land Reform Act of 1950. The purpose of the act was, as set forth in its own first article, " to improve the living conditions of farmers [and] to keep the balance of and to develop the national economy by increasing agricultural productivity" (qtd. in Pak 1015). The reforms effectively abolishing tenancy by setting the limit for maximum farm size at 7.35 acres (Pak 1015) causing the redistribution of 577 chungbos of land to 1.6 mil farmers (Shin 14). This had two main impacts.

First, a new commoner class emerged of land-owning farmers who were no longer burdened by high rent costs and were incentivized to increase production (Lew and Im). This increase in agricultural production created a strong foundation for population increases and meant that fewer farmers were needed to sustain the population, allowing for less focus on agriculture.

首先，一個新的平民階級出現(xiàn)了，他們是擁有土地的農(nóng)民，不再負(fù)擔(dān)高昂的租金成本，并激勵增加生產(chǎn)(Lew和Im)。農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)的增長為人口增長奠定了堅實的基礎(chǔ)，這意味著需要更少的農(nóng)民來維持人口，從而減少了對農(nóng)業(yè)的關(guān)注。

Second, because the previous landowners could no longer invest their money in land, they invested in businesses and schools. The presence of more schools combined with the ability of families to send children to school meant that modern education increased rapidly after 1953 (Lew and Im) which is why, between 1945-1960, enrollment in higher education increased tenfold (Seth). By 1961, South Korea had a well-educated young workforce which built the foundation for later economic growth ("The Government Role … ").

The combination of increased capital and educated individuals set the stage for economic diversification, so while 61% of the population were farmers in 1961, by 1980 that number had fallen to 38% (Seth). Land reform policies redistributed the wealth of yangban towards education, commerce and industry, helping with the lack of capital for development beyond agriculture.

資本的增加和受過教育的個人的結(jié)合為經(jīng)濟多樣化奠定了基礎(chǔ)，因此1961年61%的人口是農(nóng)民，到1980年這一數(shù)字下降到了38% (Seth)。土地改革政策將yangban的財富重新分配給了教育、商業(yè)和工業(yè)，幫助解決了農(nóng)業(yè)以外的發(fā)展資金匱乏的問題。

While some of President Rhee's policies helped set up South Korea for rapid industrial growth, his policies weren't the catalyst for the Miracle on the Han. In 1963, General Park Chung Hee seized power in a coup d'état, launching a new prosperous era through his Japan-inspired developmental state model and commitment to export-oriented industrialization.

A developmental state is a political system where the government, through interventionist economic policies, is the main actor in getting a country past periods of underdevelopment. Export Oriented Industrialization policies are policies that promote the production and exporting of goods in which the nation holds a comparative advantage to develop a country's economy (Lee).

A key goal of the governments of General Park and his successor Chun Doo Hwan was to reform the South Korean economy to be able to compete in international markets (Heo et al. 5) through export oriented industrialization.

General Park's priorities had a significant impact on South Korea's industrial structure. Earlier that decade, 40-50 percent of the total industrial structure in South Korea was based around agriculture and a mere 10-20 percent was manufacturing, but with General Park's guidance, it evened out to approximately 30 percent of the industrial structure each, balancing out the agriculture to manufacturing disparity by the late 1960s (Heo et al. 6).

In previous regimes, especially President Rhee's, corruption hindered growth, so when General Park took power he reformed the bureaucracy to perfect his developmental state. He established the Ministry of Economic Planning Board (EPB) in 1961 to guide the path to rapid industrialization. The EPB was filled with bureaucrats known for their high intellectual capability and educational background in business and economics ("The Government Role … "), especially those with ties to major corporations. This created strong bonds between the government and private sector, enabling the EPB to ascertain better economic policies (Lee).

在之前的政權(quán)中，特別是李承晚的政權(quán)，腐敗阻礙了經(jīng)濟增長，所以當(dāng)樸將軍掌權(quán)后，他改革了官僚機構(gòu)，以完善他的發(fā)展國家。1961年，他成立了經(jīng)濟規(guī)劃部(EPB)，以指導(dǎo)快速工業(yè)化的道路。EPB充斥著以高智商和商業(yè)和經(jīng)濟教育背景而聞名的官僚(“政府角色……”)，尤其是那些與大公司有聯(lián)系的官員。這在政府和私營部門之間創(chuàng)造了強大的聯(lián)系，使EPB能夠確定更好的經(jīng)濟政策(李)。

The EPB analyzed international economic demands and chose key industries of focus (Jeong 16), allocating financial resources, and formulating corresponding policy accordingly ("The Government Role … "). The EPB was responsible for the creation of seven Five Year Economic Plans, series of socioeconomic policies to achieve specific development goals that dictated the structure of the South Korean economy from 1962 to the turn of the 21st century (Park and Ok 203).

The First Plan (1962-1966) was meant to strengthen the foundation of the economy, with a focus on transforming the economy from its foreign aid-dependence amid declining US aid. The government provided assistance to basic industries and invested in the improvement of economic infrastructure (Heo et al. 5), leading to the age of light industrial products like textiles and footwear (Seth) that were produced in small factories ("The Korean Economy … ") Additionally, because a consumption-oriented economy was not self-sufficient, a major government objective was to decrease the dependence on foreign oil, a major import at the time. Thus, the First Plan prioritized the expansion of domestic electrical and coal energy industries ("The Government Role … ").

With the Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1967- 71), the government planned on fostering industries specifically for export promotion" (Heo et al. 5). Due to the lack of capital, significant natural resources, and advanced technology, the government initially promoted labor-intensive light industries for export (Heo et al. 6) to take advantage of the countries abundant workforce. The government aided the formation and survival of these new industries in two ways.

在第2個五年經(jīng)濟發(fā)展計劃(1967- 71年)中，政府計劃培育專門用于促進(jìn)出口的產(chǎn)業(yè)”(許等5)。由于缺乏資金、重要自然資源和先進(jìn)技術(shù)，政府最初促進(jìn)勞動密集型輕工業(yè)出口(Heo et al. 6)，以利用國家豐富的勞動力。政府以兩種方式幫助這些新產(chǎn)業(yè)的形成和生存。

First, new industries were promoted through import substitution (i.e. the government would make the importation of certain goods very difficult to force domestic production). Once the new industries formed, the government would aid and encourage the export of the new manufacturing goods by reducing taxes for exporters and exempting raw materials imported for export production from tariffs ("The Government Role …").

Second, the government used their authoritarian power to crack down on labor unions, preventing labor rights, limits, and safety requirements because South Korea needed low labor costs to reduce production costs to stay competitive internationally. An example of this was on May 18th, 1980, when protestors calling for labor reforms were killed, tortured, and raped during what was later called the Gwangju Massacre (Lee).

The 3rd (1972-1976) and 4th plans (1977-81) were characterized by a shift in government focus from light industries to heavy-chemical industries. (Heo et al. 6). As the economy grew with the increase in exports and there was more available initial capital, the government started pushing for Heavy-Chemical Industrialization (HCI) in order to supply new industries with raw materials and to decrease dependence on foreign funds, appointing iron and steel, transport machinery, household electronics, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals as five strategic fields ("The Government Role ...").

However, at the time, HCI was considered an expensive and risky investment that many enterprises were reluctant to embrace. So, in 1972 when Park declared martial law and assumed dictatorial power, he nationalized all banks, including commercial ones and used corporate dependency on government credit allocation alongside low-interest loans to incentivize the redirection of the economy (Heo et al. 6, Seth).

Although the upfront costs were higher with HCI than with light industries, very favorable export performance internationally made up for it. The upfront costs for HCI were similar globally, but because of South Korea's low wages, the cost of production was uniquely lower in South Korea. Because high-quality, low-cost products could be produced in South Korea, Heavy and Chemical Industries grew by 51.8 percent in 1981 ("The Government Role … ").

South Korea's newfound role as an international competitor would soon be challenged by internal political changes. Park was assassinated in 1979, and his successor Chun Doo-hwan was ousted in 1987 due to popular dissatisfaction. A new constitution and the first free presidential election that year marked South Korea's permanent transition to democracy. Without the authoritarian suppression of labor unions and labor rights, the working classes who were now politically powerful started strikes and protests. These strikes were very effective, and from the 1980s-1990s, wages increased by 18% per year because of labor unions (Seth). This removed the low-wage advantage of South Korean products, as it increased production costs. In order to maintain a competitive advantage with their exports, the government was forced to prioritize the innovation of more creative products (Jeong 25), ultimately causing the government to shift focus to capital and innovation-intensive industry (Seth).

South Korea's 5th and 7th economic plans reflected the shift in emphasis away from HCI to technology-intensive industries, such as precision machinery, electronics, and information. According to "The Government Role … " the South Korean government theorized that unique high-technology products would be in demand on the world market regardless of incremental price increases.

韓國的第5和第7次經(jīng)濟計劃反映了其重點從人機交互轉(zhuǎn)向精密機械、電子和信息等技術(shù)密集型產(chǎn)業(yè)。根據(jù)“政府的作用……”，韓國政府的理論是，無論價格上漲幅度如何，世界市場都將需要獨特的高科技產(chǎn)品。

The government developed its high technology industries on two fronts. First, South Korea spent money on education to develop human resources from a young age (Cetin 95), increasing the number of technical colleges and vocational secondary schools (Seth). Compared to other developing nations at the time, South Korea had a very well educated population, which enabled it to achieve rapid growth. In the case of the technology industry, it meant an abundance of trained engineers and entrepreneurs. Second, the government took steps to foster more research and development (R&D). The government allocated funds to research centers which helped increase R&D alongside technology and science expertise (Seth). In fact, after the 1980s most government funding went to large firm R+D (Cetin and Karadas 95) to accelerate the development of science and technology in the capable hands of large conglomerates. The government's goal was to raise the ratio of R&D investment from 2.4 to 3 percent of GNP by 1991 ("The Government Role in Economic Development").

Even as the specific prioritized industries changed, two aspects of government control did not change.

First, the exchange rate was monitored and aggressively managed to minimize fluctuation in the value of the South Korean Won. The only way to keep a stable exchange rate while an economy is growing at fast rates was to lower it artificially. This provided an incentive to export because it ensured that South Korean exports were cheaper and thus in higher demand (Heo et al. 7).

Second, the government aided the rise in the 1960s and growth of family-controlled business conglomerates called chaebols that still control the majority of South Korea's economy today. In the 1960s, General Park used state-controlled credit flow to provide subsidies, favorable loans, and tax breaks to successful enterprises at the time (i.e. the future chaebols) (Lee) to help them meet export targets established by the EPB. If the targets were met, the companies would receive additional government subsidies and more access to the growing domestic markets, but if they weren't, government funds would be withdrawn ("The Government Role…").

More successful chaebols were incentivized to continue to achieve and gain more market control and the government gained significant control over the private sector (Lee). In order to maximize economic efficiency, the state minimized unnecessary competition by limiting export licenses so that a few chaebols dominated each sector (Seth). Because chaebols already had the necessary capital base, the state pushed pre-existing chaebols into new industries instead of allowing new firms to emerge so that chaebols could develop economies of scope and scale.

更多成功的財閥被激勵繼續(xù)實現(xiàn)和獲得更多的市場控制，政府獲得了對私營部門的顯著控制(李)。為了最大限度地提高經(jīng)濟效率，國家通過限制出口許可證，將不必要的競爭最小化，讓少數(shù)財閥控制每個行業(yè)(賽斯)。由于財閥們已經(jīng)有了必要的資本基礎(chǔ)，政府沒有允許新的企業(yè)出現(xiàn)，而是將原有的財閥們推進(jìn)到新的行業(yè)，從而使財閥們能夠發(fā)展范圍和規(guī)模經(jīng)濟。

Chaebols had a few special structural features which aided their success. First, government guided diversification ( i.e. the expansion of production into different industries) meant that chaebols had many affiliates. This benefitted R&D because technology was freely shared across affiliates and group R&D centers were commonplace.

Second, as chaebols grew they could begin vertical integration (i.e. indigenizing inputs for different stages of production) through economies of scale which decreased production times and production costs.

This efficiency made the exports of chaebols very competitive on a world stage (Jeong 6). An example of this is the South Korean steel industry, where production increased 14-fold by 1972. The industry was led by Pohang Iron and Steel who owned the world's largest steel making complex and were a very powerful global competitor. South Korea's prowess in the shipbuilding industry was similar, and they became the second-largest shipbuilder in the world (Seth).

In conclusion, government intervention guided the South Korean economy into a period of rapid growth by making their exports internationally competitive, prioritizing and subsidizing the most advantageous industries, and promoting the growth and supremacy of chaebols, allowing South Korea to achieve growth that took 100 years for western nations in less than 40 years (Cetin and Karadas 94).

總之，政府干預(yù)引導(dǎo)韓國經(jīng)濟進(jìn)入了一個快速增長的時期，使其出口具有國際競爭力，優(yōu)先和補貼最具優(yōu)勢的行業(yè)，促進(jìn)財閥的增長和霸權(quán)，讓韓國在不到40年的時間里實現(xiàn)了西方國家花了100年才實現(xiàn)的增長(Cetin和Karadas 94)。

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