paper代寫-不同國(guó)家的公司治理。本文是一篇留學(xué)生paper寫作范例,主要內(nèi)容是講述公司治理的發(fā)展是一個(gè)全球性事件。不同的國(guó)家有不同的相關(guān)理論,也取決于國(guó)家所處的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況、國(guó)家的公司結(jié)構(gòu)和存在的所有權(quán)集團(tuán)。同樣重要的是要了解,不僅股東,而且其他利益相關(guān)者也與公司有關(guān),因此應(yīng)重視其他利益群體,如員工、供應(yīng)商、客戶和當(dāng)?shù)厣鐓^(qū)。下面就是這篇留學(xué)生paper寫作范文的全部?jī)?nèi)容,供參考。
Corporate Governance and theories 公司治理與理論
Development of Corporate Government is a global occurrence. Different countries have different Theories in relevance and also depend on the stage of economic condition the country is in, the corporate structure of the country and the ownership groups present. It is also important to understand that not only shareholders but other stake holders are also involved wit a company and therefore emphasis should be given to other interest groups as well like employees, suppliers, customers and local communities (Christine A Mallin 2007).
Theories associated with development of corporate governance 與公司治理發(fā)展相關(guān)的理論
Agency theory 代理理論
In the theory, there are two parties – principals and agents. Owners are considered Principal and director – agents. According to the theory due to self interest agents may not be working towards principal’s interest. In such cases the result may not be as expected by the principals or owners. A good corporate control is thus required to reduce agency problems and to keep control over director’s actions.
在理論上,有兩個(gè)當(dāng)事人——委托人和代理人。業(yè)主被視為委托人和董事-代理人。根據(jù)自利理論,代理人可能不會(huì)為委托人的利益而工作。在這種情況下,結(jié)果可能與委托人或業(yè)主的預(yù)期不符。因此,需要良好的公司控制,以減少代理問題,并保持對(duì)董事行為的控制。
Transaction cost economies 交易成本經(jīng)濟(jì)
As firms desire to grow overtime, they need capital to expand. Often a firm raises a capital by going public or including other shareholders into the firms. As the owners in the company increase it is possible that the separation of ownership and control (which mostly remains in the hands of directors) may create problems.
由于公司希望加班加點(diǎn),他們需要資本來(lái)擴(kuò)張。通常,公司通過上市或?qū)⑵渌蓶|納入公司來(lái)籌集資金。隨著公司所有者的增加,所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離(大部分仍在董事手中)可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生問題。
Stakeholder theory 利益相關(guān)者理論
As discussed earlier, a firm has a member of stakeholders and is not just accountable to shareholders. If there are other stakeholders that need to be given emphasis then the governance system is developed accordingly. Corporate governance has only recently gained more importance and although agency theory was the main theory that led to its development, stakeholder theory is gaining more importance as it evolves further. It has been observed that good corporate governance have helped business perform better and provided better access to finances.
如前所述,公司有利益相關(guān)者成員,不僅對(duì)股東負(fù)責(zé)。如果有其他利益相關(guān)者需要得到重視,則相應(yīng)地制定治理體系。公司治理最近才變得更加重要,盡管代理理論是導(dǎo)致其發(fā)展的主要理論,但隨著利益相關(guān)者理論的進(jìn)一步發(fā)展,其重要性也越來(lái)越大。據(jù)觀察,良好的公司治理有助于企業(yè)表現(xiàn)更好,并提供更好的融資渠道。
Corporate Governance in UK 英國(guó)的公司治理
Cadbury and Greenbury reports had a major contribution in UK’s Corporate Governance.
吉百利和格林伯里的報(bào)告對(duì)英國(guó)的公司治理做出了重大貢獻(xiàn)。
Cadbury Report (1992)吉百利報(bào)告
“The Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance”, also known the Cadbury report, was published in December 1992. After 1980s financial scandals, a committee was formed in may 1991 by the financial reporting councils the London stock exchange and the accountancy profession. The committee worked in the financial aspects of corporate Governance and produced a code of Best Practice, which all UK listed companies related to director remuneration, responsibilities and tenure.
“公司治理財(cái)務(wù)方面委員會(huì)的報(bào)告”,也稱為吉百利報(bào)告,于1992年12月出版。在20世紀(jì)80年代的財(cái)務(wù)丑聞之后,1991年5月由財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告委員會(huì)、倫敦證券交易所和會(huì)計(jì)專業(yè)人士組成了一個(gè)委員會(huì)。該委員會(huì)致力于公司治理的財(cái)務(wù)方面,并制定了一套最佳實(shí)踐準(zhǔn)則,所有英國(guó)上市公司都將其與董事薪酬、責(zé)任和任期相關(guān)。
Some of the recommendations were as follows. 一些建議如下。
The majority of non-executive directors should be independent of management and free from business or other relationship.
大多數(shù)非執(zhí)行董事應(yīng)獨(dú)立于管理層,不存在業(yè)務(wù)或其他關(guān)系。
Non-executive directors should be appointed for the specified terms.
非執(zhí)行董事應(yīng)按規(guī)定任期任命。
Executive remuneration should be subject to the recommendation of a remuneration committee made up entirely or mainly of non – executive directors.
高管薪酬應(yīng)服從完全或主要由非執(zhí)行董事組成的薪酬委員會(huì)的建議。
Greenbury Report (1995)格林伯里報(bào)告
The rise of remuneration of directors and absence of necessary incentives for directors to perform better works a rising concern for investors and the public at large especially for listed firms. The Greenbury committee was thus established to address the above-mentioned issue.
董事薪酬的上漲以及缺乏必要的激勵(lì)措施來(lái)提高董事的績(jī)效,這使得投資者和公眾尤其是上市公司越來(lái)越擔(dān)心。因此成立了格林伯里委員會(huì)來(lái)處理上述問題。
The committee submitted its report in 1995 and much of its findings were incorporated into the code of Best Practice on Director’s Remuneration.
該委員會(huì)于1995年提交了報(bào)告,其大部分調(diào)查結(jié)果被納入《董事薪酬最佳實(shí)踐守則》。
The report addressed for major issues “The role addressed for major issues in setting the remuneration package for the CEO and other director.
該報(bào)告針對(duì)重大問
Service contracts —————————- performance”. 服務(wù)合同----------性能
Hampel Report (1998)漢佩爾報(bào)告
After the Greenbury report in 1995, a committee was established in 1996 to review and revise the earlier recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury committees. The committee recognized that it was important to understand the situation of each company and the principle of corporate government should be more flexible to be applicable to all companies.
1995年格林伯里報(bào)告之后,1996年成立了一個(gè)委員會(huì),審查和修訂吉百利和格林伯里委員會(huì)早期的建議。委員會(huì)認(rèn)識(shí)到,了解每家公司的情況很重要,公司治理原則應(yīng)更加靈活,適用于所有公司。
While Cadbury and Greenbury reports addressed the abuse of the discretionary authority entrusted to management, Hampel viewed the same to maximize the shareholder value.
雖然吉百利和格林伯里的報(bào)告涉及濫用委托給管理層的自由裁量權(quán),但漢佩爾認(rèn)為這是為了最大限度地提高股東價(jià)值。
Combined Code (1998)聯(lián)合守則
The combined code was formed from recommendations of Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports put together. It outlined the best practices, which were not mandatory for companies to provide sufficient information to the shareholders about its practices.
這一組合代碼是根據(jù)吉百利、格林伯里和漢佩爾報(bào)告的建議組合而成的。它概述了最佳做法,但公司沒有義務(wù)向股東提供有關(guān)其做法的充分信息。
Higg’s Report 西格斯報(bào)告
The report was dedicated towards determining the role, independence and recruitment of non-executive directors. Higgs identified non-executive directors role contributing to corporate strategy, setting remuneration of executive directors, monitoring the performance of executive management et. And recommended that one third board should comprise of non-executive directors.
該報(bào)告致力于確定非執(zhí)行董事的作用、獨(dú)立性和招聘。西格斯確定了非執(zhí)行董事在公司戰(zhàn)略、制定執(zhí)行董事薪酬、監(jiān)督執(zhí)行管理層業(yè)績(jī)等方面的作用,并建議第三屆董事會(huì)應(yīng)由非執(zhí)行董事組成。
Corporate Governance in Germany 德國(guó)的公司治理
In Germany, most of the firms are either public or private limited that have shareholders who control the firm and its policies. Like many other European countries, in Germany there are a number of shareholders in a firm. Both financial and non financial investors hold considerable shares in a firm and are the most influential people. It is therefore important to take into consideration these cross-holdings that investors have when analysing the corporate governance in Germany. According to Charkham (1994), banks have considerable investment in large firms and therefore play a central role in determining the corporate policies of the firm. Banks provide long term loans to the firms and develop long term relationship with the firms in the course of time. Due to these facts the corporate governance in Germany can also be called an ‘insider system’ (Charkahm, 1994).
在德國(guó),大多數(shù)公司要么是公共有限公司,要么是私人有限公司,由股東控制公司及其政策。像許多其他歐洲國(guó)家一樣,在德國(guó),一家公司有許多股東。金融投資者和非金融投資者都持有公司相當(dāng)大的股份,是最有影響力的人。因此,在分析德國(guó)的公司治理時(shí),必須考慮投資者的交叉持股。銀行對(duì)大型公司有大量投資,因此在決定公司的公司政策方面發(fā)揮著核心作用。銀行向企業(yè)提供長(zhǎng)期貸款,并在一段時(shí)間內(nèi)與企業(yè)發(fā)展長(zhǎng)期關(guān)系。由于這些事實(shí),德國(guó)的公司治理也可以稱為“內(nèi)部人制度”。
The German corporate governance has a dual board system comprising of a management board and a supervisory board. The management board handles the day to day activities of the firm and is responsible for management of the whole firm. The supervisory board on the other hand is responsible for appointing the directors in the management board, supervising them and deciding their remuneration. The supervisory board also advices the management board on various aspects of business.
德國(guó)公司治理有一個(gè)由管理委員會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)組成的雙董事會(huì)制度。管理委員會(huì)處理公司的日?;顒?dòng),并負(fù)責(zé)整個(gè)公司的管理。另一方面,監(jiān)事會(huì)負(fù)責(zé)任命管理委員會(huì)中的董事,監(jiān)督他們并決定他們的薪酬。監(jiān)事會(huì)還就業(yè)務(wù)的各個(gè)方面向管理委員會(huì)提供咨詢意見。
“ if there were a spectrum with ‘confrontation’ at one end and ‘co-operation’ at the other, we would definitely place German attitudes and behaviour far closer to the co-operation end than, say, those of British or Americans.” (Charkham, 1994)
What Charkham (1994) indicated was how close the shareholders in German firms are to its operations and the interests of different stakeholders are given equal emphasis.
“如果有一個(gè)一端是‘對(duì)抗’,另一端是‘合作’的頻譜,我們肯定會(huì)把德國(guó)的態(tài)度和行為放在比英國(guó)人或美國(guó)人更接近合作的一端。”
Charkham指出,德國(guó)公司的股東與公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)關(guān)系密切,不同利益相關(guān)者的利益也得到同等重視。
This is supported by the Works Constitution Act 1972, according to which work council has the right to deal with employee matters and conditions of work. This is done to improve trust of the employees in the organisation by keeping them informed about company’s activities and allowing them to participate in the decisions of the company that may have effects on the workers. However the first corporate governance code, Cromme code, was first published in 2002 as discussed in the next section.
這得到了1972年《勞動(dòng)憲法法》的支持,根據(jù)該法,工作委員會(huì)有權(quán)處理員工事務(wù)和工作條件。這樣做是為了提高員工對(duì)組織的信任,讓他們了解公司的活動(dòng),并允許他們參與公司可能對(duì)員工產(chǎn)生影響的決策。然而,正如下一節(jié)所討論的那樣,第一部公司治理法典,即克羅姆法典,于2002年首次發(fā)布。
A committee chaired by Dr Gerhard Cromme was assigned the task to submit a report on corporate governance. The committee submitted the Cromme Report, also know as the Cromme Code, which was published in 2002 and has a number of sections that provide guidelines about different aspects of corporate governance. Later in 2005 there some amendments made to the code.
由格哈德·克羅姆博士主持的一個(gè)委員會(huì)被指派提交一份關(guān)于公司治理的報(bào)告。委員會(huì)提交了《克羅姆報(bào)告》,也稱為《克羅姆法典》,該報(bào)告于2002年出版,其中有許多章節(jié)提供了關(guān)于公司治理不同方面的指南。2005年晚些時(shí)候,對(duì)準(zhǔn)則進(jìn)行了一些修訂。
Some of the sections that Cromme Code covered are: Cromme Code涵蓋的部分章節(jié)包括:
General Meetings and shareholders 股東大會(huì)和股東
According to this section of the code, it is required by the companies to submit annual reports and other financial statements in the general meeting. The meeting decides how the net income has to be disclosed and whether the decision made by the management and the supervisory boards are appropriate and approved. The code also requires the firms to publish these on their website, with any other agenda for public transparency.
根據(jù)該準(zhǔn)則的這一節(jié),公司需要在股東大會(huì)上提交年度報(bào)告和其他財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表。會(huì)議決定了凈收入的披露方式,以及管理層和監(jiān)事會(huì)做出的決定是否適當(dāng)并獲得批準(zhǔn)。該準(zhǔn)則還要求公司在其網(wǎng)站上公布這些信息,以及任何其他公共透明度議程。
Co-operation between the Management Board and the Supervisory Board 管理委員會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)之間的合作
The management board being the set of directors who actually run the company operations, and the supervisory board being the one that advises and sets goals for the management board, it is important that the two boards co-operate with each other. The code therefore suggests that the management board should report its activities to the supervisory board so that the company’s strategic approach is rightly followed. The management board can seek guidance of the supervisory board in case of any issue and should look to report these immediately. The supervisory board on the other hand should monitor the progress of the management board and check if the duties assigned to management board are being performed effectively and if there are any changes to be made into them. If there is any deviation from the Cromme Code then it is the duty of the management board and the supervisory board to mention them in the annual report explaining why such deviations had occurred. The company has to keep these details available for public viewing for atleast five years.
管理委員會(huì)是實(shí)際管理公司運(yùn)營(yíng)的一組董事,監(jiān)事會(huì)是為管理委員會(huì)提供建議和設(shè)定目標(biāo)的董事,重要的是兩個(gè)董事會(huì)相互合作。因此,該準(zhǔn)則建議,管理委員會(huì)應(yīng)向監(jiān)事會(huì)報(bào)告其活動(dòng),以便正確遵循公司的戰(zhàn)略方針。如果出現(xiàn)任何問題,管理委員會(huì)可以尋求監(jiān)事會(huì)的指導(dǎo),并應(yīng)立即報(bào)告這些問題。另一方面,監(jiān)事會(huì)應(yīng)監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)的進(jìn)展,并檢查分配給管理委員會(huì)的職責(zé)是否得到有效履行,以及是否需要對(duì)其進(jìn)行任何更改。如果有任何偏離《克羅姆守則》的情況,管理委員會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)有責(zé)任在年度報(bào)告中提及這些情況,解釋為什么會(huì)發(fā)生此類偏離。該公司必須將這些細(xì)節(jié)公開至少五年。
Management Board 管理委員會(huì)
The management board is set up by the supervisory board, and it is required as per the code to report these notes in the accounts. In case of any difference in the interest of the management board and the supervisory board, it should be immediately conveyed to the supervisory board. This is important so that management board can work independently and in the best interests of the company.
The code also mentions that the remuneration of the management board should consist of both fixed salary and variable salary, as in many companies where variable salary is based on performance of the firm.
管理委員會(huì)由監(jiān)事會(huì)設(shè)立,并根據(jù)準(zhǔn)則要求在賬目中報(bào)告這些票據(jù)。如果管理委員會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)的利益有任何分歧,應(yīng)立即通知監(jiān)事會(huì)。這一點(diǎn)很重要,以便管理委員會(huì)能夠獨(dú)立工作,并符合公司的最佳利益。
該守則還提到,管理委員會(huì)的薪酬應(yīng)包括固定薪酬和可變薪酬,正如許多公司的可變薪酬是基于公司業(yè)績(jī)的。
Supervisory Board 監(jiān)事會(huì)
The supervisory board has the responsibility to determine the composition of the management board and monitoring of the management board. It is therefore important that the supervisory board has suitable knowledge, experience and ability to make good management board and set good targets. Not only this a good supervisory board can provide good guidance to the management board. The code suggests that the supervisory should be independent and not related to the management board so as to avoid any conflict of interests. The code also forbids the chairman of the management board to become the chairman of the supervisory board. The code also states that the management board directors cannot be in the supervisory board of more than 5 non group listed companies.
監(jiān)事會(huì)有責(zé)任確定管理委員會(huì)的組成和對(duì)管理委員會(huì)的監(jiān)督。因此,重要的是,監(jiān)事會(huì)應(yīng)具備適當(dāng)?shù)闹R(shí)、經(jīng)驗(yàn)和能力,以組建良好的管理委員會(huì)并設(shè)定良好的目標(biāo)。不僅如此,一個(gè)好的監(jiān)事會(huì)可以為管理委員會(huì)提供良好的指導(dǎo)。該準(zhǔn)則建議,監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)獨(dú)立,與管理委員會(huì)無(wú)關(guān),以避免任何利益沖突。該準(zhǔn)則還禁止管理委員會(huì)主席擔(dān)任監(jiān)事會(huì)主席。該準(zhǔn)則還規(guī)定,管理委員會(huì)董事不得在5家以上非集團(tuán)上市公司的監(jiān)事會(huì)任職。
The remuneration of the directors in the supervisory board can contain both fixed and performance related pay and needs to be disclosed n the annual report as well. The remuneration can be determined in the general meeting or in the articles of association. The Cromme Code has an important requirement that if supervisory board take part in less than half of the meetings in a fiscal year then it has to be mentioned in the supervisory board report.
監(jiān)事會(huì)董事的薪酬可以包括固定薪酬和績(jī)效薪酬,也需要在年度報(bào)告中披露。薪酬可在股東大會(huì)或公司章程中確定?!犊肆_姆法典》有一項(xiàng)重要要求,即如果監(jiān)事會(huì)在一個(gè)財(cái)政年度內(nèi)參加的會(huì)議少于半數(shù),則必須在監(jiān)事會(huì)報(bào)告中提及。
Transparency 透明度
The code requires the management board to disclose any information or fact that might affect the company operations and not known to the public. This is so as to keep all shareholders equally informed about the company’s facts. Disclosure should be made through media which is accessible in time to the public.
該準(zhǔn)則要求管理委員會(huì)披露可能影響公司運(yùn)營(yíng)且不為公眾所知的任何信息或事實(shí)。這是為了讓所有股東平等地了解公司的事實(shí)。應(yīng)通過及時(shí)向公眾開放的媒體進(jìn)行披露。
Reporting and Audit of the Financial Resources 財(cái)務(wù)資源報(bào)告和審計(jì)
In order to avoid any fabrication of the reports the code requires the supervisory board or the audit committee to obtain a statement from the auditor clarifying that there is no financial or any other relation between the firm and the auditor that can affect auditors independence.
According to the amendments, from 2006 onwards, it is important for the companies to disclose all elements of the directors’ remuneration. However, if 75 percent of the shareholders feel that further disclosure is not required then the firm can chose to do so.
It can be said that the corporate governance code in Germany has provided great emphasis on serving the interests of various stakeholders.
為了避免偽造報(bào)告,該準(zhǔn)則要求監(jiān)事會(huì)或?qū)徲?jì)委員會(huì)從審計(jì)師處獲得一份聲明,澄清公司與審計(jì)師之間不存在可能影響審計(jì)師獨(dú)立性的財(cái)務(wù)或任何其他關(guān)系。
根據(jù)修正案,從2006年起,公司必須披露董事薪酬的所有要素。然而,如果75%的股東認(rèn)為不需要進(jìn)一步披露,那么公司可以選擇這樣做。
可以說(shuō),德國(guó)的公司治理法非常重視為各利益相關(guān)者的利益服務(wù)。
Corporate Governance in India 印度的公司治理
Government had set new reforms introduced in India after the economic downturn in 1990-91 to open up the economy to depend on market mechanisms instead of the government. With the new reforms the committee Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), which became the regulator of the securities market aimed at transforming the public sector and the banking sector in line with international norms. As the disclosure requirements were introduced to safeguard the interests of shareholders these markets were altered.
1990-91年經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退后,印度政府制定了新的改革措施,以開放經(jīng)濟(jì),使其依賴市場(chǎng)機(jī)制而不是政府。隨著新的改革,印度證券交易委員會(huì)(SEBI)成為了證券市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu),旨在按照國(guó)際規(guī)范改造公共部門和銀行部門。隨著披露要求的引入,以保護(hù)股東利益,這些市場(chǎng)發(fā)生了變化。
After the economic downturn in India during 1990 – 91, Indian government introduced new reforms to open the economy to rely more on the market mechanisms instead of the government. The new reforms were mainly aimed at making the public sector more efficient. There were also reforms in the banking sector to bring India in line with international norms, and in the securities market, with the new committee Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) becoming the regulator of the securities market. The securities market was altered as disclosure requirements were introduced to safeguard shareholder’s interests.
在1990-91年印度經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退之后,印度政府引入了新的改革,以開放經(jīng)濟(jì),更多地依賴市場(chǎng)機(jī)制,而不是政府。新的改革主要旨在提高公共部門的效率。銀行業(yè)也進(jìn)行了改革,以使印度與國(guó)際規(guī)范保持一致,證券市場(chǎng)也進(jìn)行了變革,新的委員會(huì)印度證券交易委員會(huì)(SEBI)成為證券市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)。隨著披露要求的引入,證券市場(chǎng)發(fā)生了變化,以保護(hù)股東利益。
Kar (2001) mentions how “ foreign portfolio investment was permitted in India since 1992 and foreign institutional investors also began to play an important role in the institutionalization of the market”.
Kar提到“自1992年以來(lái),印度允許外國(guó)證券投資,外國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者也開始在市場(chǎng)制度化方面發(fā)揮重要作用”。
India has a range of business, including the public limited companies listed in the stock exchange, private companies and foreign companies. Main ownership of the companies is difficult to determine as there are very few studies in this area but we can say that after the economy opened up after 1990-91, institutional investors are gaining more shares of the market.
印度擁有一系列業(yè)務(wù),包括在證券交易所上市的公共有限公司、私人公司和外國(guó)公司。這些公司的主要所有權(quán)很難確定,因?yàn)檫@方面的研究很少,但我們可以說(shuō),1990-91年經(jīng)濟(jì)開放后,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者獲得了更多的市場(chǎng)份額。
The Confederation of Indian Industries published a ‘Desirable Code of Corporate Governance’ in 1998 and many companies took the recommendation of the committee on board. Still there are many companies that have poor governance practices which has led to the concerns about financial reporting practices, their accountability to losses being suffered by investors and the resultant loss of confidence that this caused. A recent example of Satyam Computers proves this that still there are companies, which are not following the Code of Corporate Governance.
1998年,印度工業(yè)聯(lián)合會(huì)發(fā)布了《理想的公司治理準(zhǔn)則》,許多公司采納了委員會(huì)的建議。盡管如此,仍有許多公司治理不善,導(dǎo)致人們對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告做法、投資者遭受損失的責(zé)任以及由此導(dǎo)致的信心喪失感到擔(dān)憂。Satyam Computers最近的一個(gè)例子證明了這一點(diǎn),仍然有一些公司沒有遵守《公司治理準(zhǔn)則》。
SEBI formally established the Committee on Corporate Governance in May 1999, chaired by Shri Kumar Mangalam Birla. The report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee on Corporate Governance was published in 2000. The report emphasizes the importance of corporate governance for future growth of the economy and the capital market. Three key aspects underlying corporate governance are defined as accountability, transparency, and equality of treatment for all stakeholders in terms of information. The recommendations of the SEBI are split into mandatory requirements, which are essential for effective corporate governance, and non-mandatory requirements.
SEBI于1999年5月正式成立了公司治理委員會(huì),由Shri Kumar Mangalam Birla擔(dān)任主席。Kumar Mangalam Birla公司治理委員會(huì)的報(bào)告于2000年發(fā)布。該報(bào)告強(qiáng)調(diào)了公司治理對(duì)未來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和資本市場(chǎng)的重要性。公司治理的三個(gè)關(guān)鍵方面被定義為問責(zé)制、透明度和所有利益相關(guān)者在信息方面的平等待遇。SEBI的建議分為對(duì)有效公司治理至關(guān)重要的強(qiáng)制性要求和非強(qiáng)制性要求。
Board of Directors 董事會(huì)
Board in Indian companies should comprise of the Executive Directors and Non-Executive Directors and Independent Directors. The code recommends not less than 50 percent of the board should be comprised of the Non-Executive Directors, where there is a non-executive chairman, and at least one-third of the board should comprise independent directors, where there is an executive chairman, and finally at least half the board should be independent, the latter being mandatory.
印度公司的董事會(huì)應(yīng)由執(zhí)行董事、非執(zhí)行董事和獨(dú)立董事組成。該準(zhǔn)則建議,如果有非執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng),則不少于50%的董事會(huì)成員應(yīng)由非執(zhí)行董事組成,如果有執(zhí)行董事長(zhǎng),至少三分之一的董事會(huì)應(yīng)由獨(dú)立董事組成,最后,至少一半的董事會(huì)應(yīng)該是獨(dú)立的,后者是強(qiáng)制性的。
Nominee Directors 提名董事
The Indian system allows nominee directors appointed by the financial or investment institutions to protect their investment in the company. Such directors should have the same responsibility as other directors and be accountable to the shareholders.
印度的制度允許金融或投資機(jī)構(gòu)任命的提名董事保護(hù)其對(duì)公司的投資。此類董事應(yīng)與其他董事承擔(dān)相同的責(zé)任,并對(duì)股東負(fù)責(zé)。
Chairman of the Board 董事會(huì)主席
The roles of the chairman and the chief executive are different, the code identifies the roles as related and may be combined and performed by one person.
董事長(zhǎng)和首席執(zhí)行官的角色是不同的,代碼將這些角色確定為相關(guān)的,可以由一個(gè)人組合和執(zhí)行。
Audit Committee 審計(jì)委員會(huì)
The audit committee has many mandatory recommendations, like the committee should comprise at least three members, all of them being the non-executive directors. The audit committee is empowered to seek external advice as appropriate and to seek information from any employee.
審計(jì)委員會(huì)有許多強(qiáng)制性建議,如委員會(huì)應(yīng)至少由三名成員組成,所有成員均為非執(zhí)行董事。審計(jì)委員會(huì)有權(quán)酌情尋求外部建議,并向任何員工尋求信息。
Remuneration Committee 薪酬委員會(huì)
Remuneration committee is set up to decide on the remuneration of the executive directors. Committee should be comprised of at least three non-executive, chaired by an independent director. All the remuneration package of the directors must be disclosed in the annual report with details on all the elements including the fixed salary and performance based incentives. Another mandatory requirement is that the board of directors must decide on the remuneration package of the non-executive directors.
設(shè)立薪酬委員會(huì),決定執(zhí)行董事的薪酬。委員會(huì)應(yīng)由至少三名非執(zhí)行董事組成,由獨(dú)立董事?lián)沃飨?。董事的所有薪酬方案必須在年度?bào)告中披露,并詳細(xì)說(shuō)明所有要素,包括固定薪酬和基于績(jī)效的激勵(lì)措施。另一項(xiàng)強(qiáng)制性要求是,董事會(huì)必須決定非執(zhí)行董事的薪酬方案。
Board Procedures 董事會(huì)程序
Board Meetings should be held a minimum of 4 times in a year with a maximum of 4 months between two meetings and that a director must not be involved in more than 10 committees or act as a chairman in more than 5 committees.
董事會(huì)會(huì)議每年至少召開4次,兩次會(huì)議之間最多間隔4個(gè)月,董事不得參與10個(gè)以上的委員會(huì),或擔(dān)任5個(gè)以上委員會(huì)的主席。
Management 經(jīng)營(yíng)管理
Management should ensure smooth day – to – day activities of the company. There should be disclosure of the company’s performance, position and other things of interest to shareholders in the annual report.
管理層應(yīng)確保公司日?;顒?dòng)的順利進(jìn)行。年度報(bào)告中應(yīng)披露公司的業(yè)績(jī)、地位和其他股東感興趣的事項(xiàng)。
Shareholders 股東
Shareholders are allowed to be able to participate in the annual general meeting, therefore whenever there is a new appointment of a director it must be in the knowledge of the shareholders about the same.
股東可以參加年度股東大會(huì),因此,無(wú)論何時(shí)有新的董事任命,股東都必須了解。
Manner of Implementation 實(shí)施方式
Companies must have a separate section on Corporate Governance in its annual report. Non-compliance of any recommendations should be highlighted and explained.
公司必須在年度報(bào)告中單獨(dú)列出公司治理部分。應(yīng)強(qiáng)調(diào)并解釋不遵守任何建議的情況。
The Indian code is rather complex as compared to UK and Germany as it has a number of mandatory and non-mandatory recommendations in its code. Although India has good recommendations on corporate governance code but still the acceptance of code in many companies is still lagging.
與英國(guó)和德國(guó)相比,印度準(zhǔn)則相當(dāng)復(fù)雜,因?yàn)槠錅?zhǔn)則中有許多強(qiáng)制性和非強(qiáng)制性建議。盡管印度對(duì)公司治理準(zhǔn)則有很好的建議,但許多公司對(duì)準(zhǔn)則的接受程度仍然很低。
Roles, Duties, Responsibilities and Liabilities of Directors 董事的角色、職責(zé)、責(zé)任和責(zé)任
Functions of Directors 董事的職能
In 1844 an Act in Parliament described directors as ‘ the persons having direction, conduct, management or superintendence’ of a company’s affairs. (Alfred Read) described director as a special kind of agent, whose function is to control the company’s affairs. The directors in a company have certain responsibilities at law, which they must perform efficiently and effectively. In large organisations the major role of the board is to set the context of the strategy and not to formulate the strategy. To accomplish this, the board must keep on reviewing the corporate definition ‘what business are we in’. This can be done by assessing and reviewing strategic proposals and changing them by giving comment and advice on the same, by encouraging managers to work on their strategic aims. The results of these sets the standards of the organisation as well as the standards others have to attain. Another challenge for the directors in an organisation is to balance the powers of managers with accountability to the shareholders. The board of directors act as the internal mechanism for control to overcome the principal agent problem. Directors also help in acquiring critical resources and responding to environmental forces and their impact on the organisation. These were however how the roles were perceived in the 1970s and after a number of highly publicised cases of corporate fraud and failure there has been a strong focus on policy issues. According to the Companies Act 2006, the duties of the directors have been identified seven-folds. These have been formulated to keep the acts of the directors in the interest of the company they serve and their shareholders. It is quite interesting how the roles and duties are slowly being more specifically defined and the need of the directors to comply with these by enforcing these into the Company Act.
844年,議會(huì)的一項(xiàng)法案將董事描述為“對(duì)公司事務(wù)有指導(dǎo)、行為、管理或監(jiān)督權(quán)的人”。將董事描述為一種特殊的代理人,其職能是控制公司事務(wù)。公司董事在法律上負(fù)有一定的責(zé)任,他們必須高效地履行這些責(zé)任。在大型組織中,董事會(huì)的主要作用是制定戰(zhàn)略背景,而不是制定戰(zhàn)略。為了實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目標(biāo),董事會(huì)必須不斷審查公司定義“我們從事什么業(yè)務(wù)”。要做到這一點(diǎn),可以評(píng)估和審查戰(zhàn)略提案,并對(duì)其進(jìn)行修改,對(duì)其提出意見和建議,鼓勵(lì)管理者努力實(shí)現(xiàn)其戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)。這些結(jié)果制定了組織的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以及其他人必須達(dá)到的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。組織董事面臨的另一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)是平衡管理者的權(quán)力與對(duì)股東的責(zé)任。董事會(huì)是克服委托代理問題的內(nèi)部控制機(jī)制。董事還幫助獲得關(guān)鍵資源,應(yīng)對(duì)環(huán)境力量及其對(duì)組織的影響。然而,在20世紀(jì)70年代,人們是如何看待這些角色的,在一系列高度公開的公司欺詐和失敗案例之后,人們更加關(guān)注政策問題。根據(jù)《2006年公司法》,董事的職責(zé)已經(jīng)確定了七倍。制定這些規(guī)定是為了使董事的行為符合其所服務(wù)的公司及其股東的利益。很有意思的是,角色和職責(zé)是如何慢慢地被更具體地定義的,以及董事們需要通過將其納入《公司法》來(lái)遵守這些規(guī)定的。
Safeguarding the Shareholders 保護(hù)股東
An important function of the board is to ensure that the interests of the members are properly safeguarded. If saving and investment are to play their proper part in the future, the investor must be assured of fair treatment and an adequate return, and it is for the directors to ensure that, so far as is consistent with the circumstances, he is not disappointed.
董事會(huì)的一個(gè)重要職能是確保成員的利益得到適當(dāng)保護(hù)。如果儲(chǔ)蓄和投資要在未來(lái)發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的作用,投資者必須得到公平對(duì)待和充分回報(bào)的保證,董事會(huì)應(yīng)確保,只要符合情況,投資者不會(huì)失望。
Take Over Bids 接管投標(biāo)
The function of the board in safeguarding the interests of shareholders is of particular importance in take-over situations. The general rule regarding the exercise of directors’ powers applies that the interests of their company must be their paramount consideration. It follows that the directors of a company, when advising their shareholders whether to accept or reject an offer for their shares, must disregard the effect he take-over will have on their own personal positions.
在接管情況下,董事會(huì)在維護(hù)股東利益方面的作用尤為重要。關(guān)于行使董事權(quán)力的一般規(guī)則適用于其公司利益必須是其首要考慮因素。因此,公司董事在建議股東接受或拒絕其股份要約時(shí),必須忽略其接管對(duì)其個(gè)人立場(chǎng)的影響。
Ensuring Progress 確保進(jìn)度
Another function is that of ensuring that the operations of the company are kept under constant review so that changes which are necessary are made without delay when changes take place in public taste or in political and economic conditions.
另一個(gè)職能是確保公司的運(yùn)營(yíng)不斷受到審查,以便在公眾口味或政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)條件發(fā)生變化時(shí),及時(shí)做出必要的改變。
Checking Up on Progress 檢查進(jìn)度
A board must check up on results in order to ensure that the policy that has been laid down is being carried out and that the results expected from it have been obtained. Proper statements should be presented to the directors at regular intervals to keep them informed of what is happening.
董事會(huì)必須檢查結(jié)果,以確保已制定的政策得到執(zhí)行,并獲得預(yù)期結(jié)果。應(yīng)定期向董事會(huì)提交適當(dāng)?shù)穆暶?,使其了解正在發(fā)生的情況。
Powers of Directors 董事的權(quán)利
The duty of the board is to see that the business is carried in accordance with the memorandum and articles of association. While some powers may be reserved for shareholders, some powers can only be exercised by the board of directors.
Often the directors are given power to declare and pay interim dividends during the year if in their opinion the profits of the company justify them. It is also usual for the fixed dividends on preference shares to be authorized by the board. Other powers usually vested in the board are the allotment of shares, the making of calls, the forfeiture of shares for non-payment o calls, the appointment of the chairman and of agents, officers and servants of the company and all matters of policy and management which are of special importance. Also the directors may delegate any of their powers to committees consisting of such members of their body as they think fit; any committee so formed shall in the exercise of the powers so delegated conform to any regulations that may be imposed on it by the directors.
董事會(huì)的職責(zé)是確保業(yè)務(wù)按照公司章程大綱進(jìn)行。雖然有些權(quán)力可能保留給股東,但有些權(quán)力只能由董事會(huì)行使。
通常情況下,如果董事認(rèn)為公司利潤(rùn)合理,他們有權(quán)宣布并支付年度中期股息。優(yōu)先股的固定股息通常由董事會(huì)授權(quán)。通常賦予董事會(huì)的其他權(quán)力包括分配股份、催繳股款、因未繳股款而沒收股份、任命公司主席和代理人、高級(jí)職員和雇員以及所有具有特殊重要性的政策和管理事項(xiàng)。此外,董事會(huì)可將其任何權(quán)力委托給由其認(rèn)為合適的董事組成的委員會(huì);如此組成的任何委員會(huì)在行使如此授予的權(quán)力時(shí),應(yīng)遵守董事會(huì)可能對(duì)其施加的任何規(guī)定。
Remuneration of Directors 董事薪酬
Salary has traditionally been described as a word that represents as monthly income of an individual. Directors Remuneration has been a major concern for investors for long. It is observed that director’s remuneration has some or most elements of the following:
工資傳統(tǒng)上被描述為代表個(gè)人月收入的一個(gè)詞。長(zhǎng)期以來(lái),董事薪酬一直是投資者關(guān)注的主要問題。據(jù)觀察,董事薪酬包含以下部分或大部分要素:
Basic Salary 基本工資
Benefits in Kind 實(shí)物利益
Annual Bonus 年度獎(jiǎng)金
Share Options 股票期權(quán)
Pension Rights 養(yǎng)老金權(quán)利
Basic Salary 基本工資
Basic Salary is a fixed part of the salary that directors get. The basic is generally in the range that similar jobs are offered. Individual experience, skills, and commitment also form an important factor of determining the basic salary. It is also important for the company to analyze skills, and job security related to the individual while setting the basic pay.
基本工資是董事工資的固定部分?;竟ぷ魍ǔT谔峁╊愃乒ぷ鞯姆秶鷥?nèi)。個(gè)人經(jīng)驗(yàn)、技能和承諾也是決定基本工資的重要因素。對(duì)于公司來(lái)說(shuō),在設(shè)定基本工資時(shí),分析與個(gè)人相關(guān)的技能和工作保障也很重要。
Benefits in Kind 實(shí)物利益
Certain companies provide the directors with some benefits in kind. For example provision of goods, travel and luxury items are some kinds of benefits given to the directors of the company. It is however important that the remuneration committee keeps a close check on such benefits and reviews them periodically, annually provided to improve executive performance.
某些公司向董事會(huì)提供一些實(shí)物福利。例如,提供商品、旅行和奢侈品是給予公司董事的一些福利。然而,薪酬委員會(huì)必須密切檢查這些福利,并定期、每年對(duì)其進(jìn)行審查,以提高高管績(jī)效。
Annual Bonuses 年度獎(jiǎng)金
Annual bonuses are given based on the performance of company or division. It is mostly a variable form of remuneration and is generally a percentage of basic pay. Annual bonuses can act as motivation for directors’ to improve their performance. It is therefore important that the remuneration committee sets the good performance targets for the directors.
年度獎(jiǎng)金根據(jù)公司或部門的業(yè)績(jī)發(fā)放。它主要是一種可變的薪酬形式,通常是基本薪酬的百分比。年度獎(jiǎng)金可以作為董事提高績(jī)效的動(dòng)機(jī)。因此,薪酬委員會(huì)必須為董事設(shè)定良好的績(jī)效目標(biāo)。
Long Term Incentive Schemes (Share Options) 長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)計(jì)劃(股票期權(quán))
Executive share option is a long-term incentive scheme that has been used by companies for long. Share Options are provided at a lower price than that in the market or at some future date at current prices. This is a factor used to align directors and shareholders interests. The directors thus would want the share prices to go up so as to benefit from the returns from their holdings.
However, the directors may sell off their shares and loose interest in share prices thereafter. In UK a provision in the code C6, limits directors to exercise their share options, for at least three years. This is done to keep directors interest in the share prices high for at least that period. A benefit for share options is that it is not taxed until the shares are sold and thus provide the directors a non-taxed form of investment for a specified period.
高管股票期權(quán)是一種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)計(jì)劃,長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)一直為公司所采用。股票期權(quán)以低于市場(chǎng)價(jià)格的價(jià)格提供,或在未來(lái)某個(gè)日期以當(dāng)前價(jià)格提供。這是一個(gè)用于協(xié)調(diào)董事和股東利益的因素。因此,董事會(huì)希望股價(jià)上漲,以便從持股收益中獲益。 然而,董事會(huì)可能會(huì)出售其股份,并在此后放松對(duì)股價(jià)的興趣。在英國(guó),代碼C6中的一項(xiàng)規(guī)定限制董事行使其股票期權(quán)至少三年。這樣做是為了至少在這段時(shí)間內(nèi)保持董事們對(duì)股價(jià)高企的興趣。股票期權(quán)的一個(gè)好處是,在股票出售之前不征稅,從而為董事提供了一種特定時(shí)期內(nèi)的免稅投資形式。
Pension Rights 養(yǎng)老金權(quán)利
“Pension Entitlements are a key element in the total Remuneration, with important longer term implications for the individual and the company” (Greenbury, 1995). The pension provision is carefully considered by the remuneration committees, and is measured in terms of the value of pension entitlements earned during the year.
“養(yǎng)老金權(quán)利是總薪酬中的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵因素,對(duì)個(gè)人和公司具有重要的長(zhǎng)期影響”。養(yǎng)老金規(guī)定由薪酬委員會(huì)仔細(xì)考慮,并根據(jù)當(dāng)年獲得的養(yǎng)老金權(quán)益價(jià)值進(jìn)行衡量。
Remuneration can be defined as the aim to reward people fairly, consistently and equitably in accordance to their value to the organization. The impact of executive remuneration on the efficiency of the company can be explained with many different theories. Other policies and theories on effective remuneration, like theory of Human Motivation, are based on the need for stability and sustained staff commitment. Also there are surveyed and comparable pay market for different grades and specialists. Remuneration also depends on the pay structure practice in comparable organizations. Members of board of directors who are not the employees or major shareholders are paid for their services as directors of the company. In the past directors compensation was relatively dependent on the number of hours they devoted to the company but according to the new federal law a new sense of public outrage has appeared and a new fear of shareholder litigation has caused directors to work even harder as before and hence many of the determinants have changed since then.
paper范文總結(jié):薪酬可以定義為根據(jù)員工對(duì)組織的價(jià)值,公平、一致和公平地獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)員工的目標(biāo)。高管薪酬對(duì)公司效率的影響可以用許多不同的理論來(lái)解釋。其他關(guān)于有效薪酬的政策和理論,如人力激勵(lì)理論,都是基于穩(wěn)定和持續(xù)員工承諾的需要。此外,還有針對(duì)不同職級(jí)和專家的調(diào)查和可比薪酬市場(chǎng)。薪酬還取決于類似組織的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)實(shí)踐。非員工或大股東的董事會(huì)成員因其作為公司董事的服務(wù)而獲得報(bào)酬。過去,董事的薪酬相對(duì)取決于他們?cè)诠竟ぷ鞯男r(shí)數(shù),但根據(jù)新的聯(lián)邦法律,出現(xiàn)了一種新的公眾憤慨感,對(duì)股東訴訟的新恐懼使董事們像以前一樣更加努力工作,因此許多決定因素自那以后發(fā)生了變化。本站提供各國(guó)各專業(yè)留學(xué)生paper代寫或指導(dǎo)服務(wù),如有需要可咨詢本平臺(tái)。
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