Paper代寫參考-歐盟的能源安全和需求以及土耳其作為能源走廊的作用。本文是一篇留學(xué)生國(guó)際問題研究課程的paper寫作范文,主要內(nèi)容是講述預(yù)計(jì)到2035年,能源消費(fèi)領(lǐng)先國(guó)家的需求將增長(zhǎng)35%。據(jù)估計(jì),到2035年,化石燃料將繼續(xù)成為85%的主要能源。簽署《巴黎協(xié)定》后,世界試圖使用低碳能源系統(tǒng),因此可再生能源成為一種重要的替代選擇。同時(shí)這篇paper會(huì)對(duì)土耳其作為能源走廊的作用進(jìn)行研究分析,具體內(nèi)容請(qǐng)參與以下paper范文的具體內(nèi)容。
1.Introduction 引言
The demand of the leading countries in energy consumption is expected to increase by 35% by 2035. It is estimated that in 2035, fossil fuels will continue to be the main source of energy with 85%. After the sign Paris Agreement, the World try to use a lower-carbon energy system, so renewable energy become prominent as an alternative option (Aykin, Tache and Karaman, 2017, p.287-288).
Secure energy supply is vitally important for all countries. The European Commission described energy security as the ability of all consumers to access energy products in the market at an uninterrupted and reasonable price. However, there are so many risks such as economic, regulatory, physical, social, political, environmental, extreme weather conditions and equipment failure. All governments develop a variety of policies to provide more reliable, affordable and risk-free energy (Aykin, Tache and Karaman, 2017, p.287-288). The EU is highly dependent on Russia in the field of energy. However, Energy trade is a key issue in EU-Russia relations. Nearly half of the gas delivered from Russia to the EU passes through Ukraine (Siddi, 2016, p.108). The energy security of the EU is always under threat due to the tensions between Russia and Ukraine. Both the EU and Russia dwell on new routes, such as Turkey.
安全的能源供應(yīng)對(duì)所有國(guó)家都至關(guān)重要。歐盟委員會(huì)將能源安全描述為所有消費(fèi)者以不間斷、合理的價(jià)格獲取市場(chǎng)上能源產(chǎn)品的能力。然而,存在許多風(fēng)險(xiǎn),如經(jīng)濟(jì)、監(jiān)管、物理、社會(huì)、政治、環(huán)境、極端天氣條件和設(shè)備故障。各國(guó)政府都制定了各種政策,以提供更可靠、負(fù)擔(dān)得起和無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的能源。歐盟在能源領(lǐng)域高度依賴俄羅斯。然而,能源貿(mào)易是歐俄關(guān)系中的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵問題。俄羅斯向歐盟輸送的天然氣中有近一半通過烏克蘭。由于俄羅斯和烏克蘭之間的緊張關(guān)系,歐盟的能源安全始終受到威脅。歐盟和俄羅斯都在探索新的路線,比如土耳其。
The geographical location of Turkey provides an advantage to be an energy corridor. Although it does not have important energy resources, this unique location enables Turkey to one of the region’s key states (Ersen and Celikpala, 2019, p.585). Turkey has already many pipelines. It is becoming indispensable for the EU, especially in gas supply. Due to the most important country of the southern gas corridor will possibly strengthen its own position in the future (Winrow, 2013, p.145-146).
土耳其的地理位置為能源走廊提供了優(yōu)勢(shì)。盡管土耳其沒有重要的能源資源,但這一獨(dú)特的地理位置使土耳其成為該地區(qū)的關(guān)鍵州之一。土耳其已經(jīng)擁有許多管道。對(duì)歐盟來說,它正變得不可或缺,尤其是在天然氣供應(yīng)方面。由于南部天然氣走廊最重要的國(guó)家,未來可能會(huì)加強(qiáng)其自身的地位。
The aim of this paper is to define the energy issues of the European Union (EU) and to identify the potential and future of Turkey in securing energy supply to the EU. Firstly, general information was given about the energy consumption and current state of the EU, the EU-Russia relations were defined, the steps taken by the EU in the field of energy security were examined and finally, Turkey’s importance to provide energy to the EU was mentioned.
本文旨在界定歐盟的能源問題,并確定土耳其在確保歐盟能源供應(yīng)方面的潛力和未來。首先,提供了關(guān)于歐盟能源消耗和現(xiàn)狀的一般信息,界定了歐盟與俄羅斯的關(guān)系,審查了歐盟在能源安全領(lǐng)域采取的步驟,最后,提到了土耳其向歐盟提供能源的重要性。
2.Energy Issues of the EU 歐盟的能源問題
2.1 An Outlook of the EU’s Energy 歐盟能源展望
Large population and high living standards of Europe cause great energy consumption. As one of the world’s greatest energy importer, the EU is a foreign-dependent region on energy. There is a significant difference between Europe’s energy production and consumption, which makes almost all European countries dependent on external energy. Energy imports account for one-fifth of the EU’s total imports. Some member states such as Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta highly dependent on foreign energy sources, while some of them like Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Romania less dependent. However, the EU has targets such as reducing the greenhouse gas rate, growing renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency. In addition, the EU is looking for ways to increase energy diversity (Bahgat, 2015, p.61-62).
歐洲人口眾多,生活水平高,能源消耗大。作為世界上最大的能源進(jìn)口國(guó)之一,歐盟是一個(gè)能源依賴外國(guó)的地區(qū)。歐洲的能源生產(chǎn)和消費(fèi)之間存在顯著差異,這使得幾乎所有歐洲國(guó)家都依賴外部能源。能源進(jìn)口占?xì)W盟進(jìn)口總額的五分之一。塞浦路斯、盧森堡和馬耳他等一些成員國(guó)高度依賴外國(guó)能源,而愛沙尼亞、捷克共和國(guó)和羅馬尼亞等成員國(guó)則較少依賴外國(guó)能源。然而,歐盟有降低溫室氣體排放率、增加可再生能源和提高能源效率等目標(biāo)。此外,歐盟正在尋找增加能源多樣性的方法。
About 70% of their own sources are located in 5 member countries and provide only almost half of energy consumption. Moreover, considering the ever-increasing energy needs of EU member states, it is estimated that by 2030, foreign energy dependence will increase to 75%. The EU is dependent to export on oil by 83% and gas by 65%. Russia, the Middle East, and the North Sea are the main energy suppliers of the EU (Koukoudakis, 2017, p.109). While petrol and petroleum products account for 33.8% of the EU’s total energy consumption, the share of gas, 23.3%; solid fuels, 17.5 %; nuclear power, 13.5%; and renewables, 11.0% (Bahgat, 2015, p.62-63).
約70%的能源來自5個(gè)成員國(guó),僅提供近一半的能源消耗。此外,考慮到歐盟成員國(guó)日益增長(zhǎng)的能源需求,預(yù)計(jì)到2030年,外國(guó)能源依賴將增加到75%。歐盟對(duì)石油和天然氣的依賴度分別為83%和65%。俄羅斯、中東和北海是歐盟的主要能源供應(yīng)國(guó)。雖然汽油和石油產(chǎn)品占?xì)W盟能源消費(fèi)總量的33.8%,但天然氣占23.3%;固體燃料17.5%;核電,13.5%;可再生能源,11.0%。
According to data of 2018, the EU imported gas from Russia, Norway, Algeria, and Qatar at 40.2%, 35%, 11.3% and 5.8%, respectively; and oil import of EU was at 27.5% from Russia and 11.2% from Norway. Energy imports accounted for 17% of total EU imports, while the share of oil was 12%, gas was 4%. Italy, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom are the main gas and oil importers (Ec.europa.eu, 2019).
根據(jù)2018年的數(shù)據(jù),歐盟從俄羅斯、挪威、阿爾及利亞和卡塔爾進(jìn)口天然氣的比例分別為40.2%、35%、11.3%和5.8%;歐盟從俄羅斯和挪威的石油進(jìn)口分別為27.5%和11.2%。能源進(jìn)口占?xì)W盟進(jìn)口總額的17%,而石油占12%,天然氣占4%。意大利、德國(guó)、西班牙、荷蘭和英國(guó)是主要的天然氣和石油進(jìn)口國(guó)。
2.2 Russia-the EU Relations 俄羅斯與歐盟的關(guān)系
Gas and oil trade have always played a key role in European-Russian relations. The Soviet Union first began selling gas and oil by way of pipelines to the members of the Warsaw Pact in the 1960s. A short time later, many other Europe countries such as Italy, Finland, France, Austria, and West Germany became a significant purchaser for the fossil fuels. After the 1973-1974 oil crisis, the strategic impact of Soviet gas and oil increased in Europe. Soviet gas exports almost doubled between 1980 and 1990 under the influence of the Urengoy-Uzhgorod pipeline, which was initiated in 1983 and shipment Siberian gas to Europe. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia continued to be Europe’s main gas supplier because it held important fossil fuel fields (Siddi, 2016, p.108). Europe imported 40% of gas, 30% of crude oil and 39% solid fuel from Russia (Ec.europa.eu, 2019). This commercial relationship is vitally important for Russia as well as for Europe. Energy sales account for a large portion of Russia’s total export revenue, and Europe is one of the main targets of these exports (Siddi, 2016, p.108). Although the share of gas in this energy trade is much lower than crude oil and petroleum products, it is the main subject of the discussions. The main reason for this is that East-Central European countries do not have the capacity to back up Russian gas and cannot trust Russia due to historical events.
天然氣和石油貿(mào)易在歐俄關(guān)系中一直發(fā)揮著關(guān)鍵作用。20世紀(jì)60年代,蘇聯(lián)首次通過管道向華約成員國(guó)出售天然氣和石油。不久之后,意大利、芬蘭、法國(guó)、奧地利和西德等許多其他歐洲國(guó)家成為化石燃料的重要買家。1973-1974年石油危機(jī)后,蘇聯(lián)天然氣和石油對(duì)歐洲的戰(zhàn)略影響有所增加。1980年至1990年間,蘇聯(lián)天然氣出口幾乎翻了一番,這是受烏倫戈伊-烏日哥羅德管道的影響,該管道于1983年開通,并將西伯利亞天然氣運(yùn)往歐洲。蘇聯(lián)解體后,俄羅斯繼續(xù)是歐洲的主要天然氣供應(yīng)國(guó),因?yàn)樗鼡碛兄匾幕剂项I(lǐng)域。歐洲從俄羅斯進(jìn)口了40%的天然氣、30%的原油和39%的固體燃料。這種商業(yè)關(guān)系對(duì)俄羅斯和歐洲都至關(guān)重要。能源銷售占俄羅斯總出口收入的很大一部分,而歐洲是這些出口的主要目標(biāo)之一。雖然天然氣在這一能源貿(mào)易中的份額遠(yuǎn)低于原油和石油產(chǎn)品,但它是討論的主要主題。其主要原因是,中東歐國(guó)家沒有能力備份俄羅斯天然氣,而且由于歷史事件,無法信任俄羅斯。
Russian gas is transported to Europe via three main pipelines: the Ukrainian pipeline network, the Yamal-Europe pipeline, and the Nord Stream pipeline. The gas flow from Russia to the EU took place smoothly until 2004, but this situation began to change with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. There were disputes between Moscow and the new Ukrainian government, which pro-NATO and pro-EU, on gas prices. As a result of these disputes, gas flow interruptions occurred in 2006 and 2009, and especially Central and Eastern European countries were severely affected by these interruptions. Hence, it is revealed that European states should have resource diversity for gas security (Siddi, 2016, p.109-110). As a result of recent disagreements, Russia wants to exclude the Ukrainian pipeline, but it is not possible to do so in the short term because a large part of the gas exported to Europe is transferred via this line. Many countries such as Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria directly depend on the Ukrainian line and most Balkan countries do not have enough substructure in order to supply gas from somewhere else in the state of emergency (Siddi, 2016, p.111).
俄羅斯天然氣通過三條主要管道輸送到歐洲:烏克蘭管道網(wǎng)、亞馬爾-歐洲管道和北溪管道。直到2004年,從俄羅斯到歐盟的天然氣流動(dòng)才順利進(jìn)行,但隨著烏克蘭的橙色革命,這種情況開始改變。莫斯科和支持北約和歐盟的烏克蘭新政府在天然氣價(jià)格問題上存在爭(zhēng)議。由于這些爭(zhēng)端,2006年和2009年發(fā)生了氣流中斷,尤其是中歐和東歐國(guó)家受到這些中斷的嚴(yán)重影響。因此,據(jù)透露,歐洲國(guó)家應(yīng)該擁有天然氣安全的資源多樣性。由于最近的分歧,俄羅斯希望排除烏克蘭管道,但短期內(nèi)不可能這樣做,因?yàn)槌隹诘綒W洲的大部分天然氣都是通過這條管道輸送的。許多國(guó)家,如奧地利、斯洛伐克、匈牙利、克羅地亞、羅馬尼亞、斯洛文尼亞和保加利亞,直接依賴烏克蘭線,大多數(shù)巴爾干國(guó)家沒有足夠的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施,無法在緊急狀態(tài)下從其他地方供應(yīng)天然氣。
After 2019, Russia wants to by-pass Ukraine in gas shipping to the EU, but the EU wants to keep Ukraine in the energy market for various reasons (Siddi, 2016, p.111). However, Gazprom has implemented Turk Stream and Nord Stream II projects as an alternative to the Ukrainian pipeline. Nevertheless, the total capacity of two projects is 86.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year while the Ukrainian pipeline’s capacity is 147 bcm of gas (Gazprom.com 2019). The tension between Russia and Ukraine appears to continue to threaten EU energy supply security.
2019年后,俄羅斯希望繞過烏克蘭向歐盟輸送天然氣,但出于各種原因,歐盟希望將烏克蘭留在能源市場(chǎng)。然而,俄羅斯天然氣工業(yè)股份公司已實(shí)施Turk Stream和Nord Stream II項(xiàng)目,作為烏克蘭管道的替代方案。盡管如此,兩個(gè)項(xiàng)目的總產(chǎn)能為每年865億立方米天然氣,而烏克蘭管道的產(chǎn)能為147bcm天然氣。俄羅斯和烏克蘭之間的緊張局勢(shì)似乎繼續(xù)威脅著歐盟的能源供應(yīng)安全。
2.3 Security of Energy Supply of the EU 歐盟能源供應(yīng)安全
According to The European Commission energy security is “the ability to ensure that future essential energy needs can be met, both by means of adequate domestic resources worked under economically acceptable conditions or maintained as strategic reserves, and by calling upon accessible and stable external sources supplemented where appropriate by strategic stocks” (Koukoudakis, 2017, p.109). Most European states do not have enough domestic energy sources; thus, they need to import energy, hence the security of supply is vital importance for them. Purchasing of energy from the various provider is the best way for energy security to prevent possible supply shocks. Security of demand for energy suppliers is long-term agreements with buyers, reducing price volatility, increasing the number of the purchaser and tackling the competition of other providers (Siddi, 2018, p.1556).
根據(jù)歐盟委員會(huì)的說法,能源安全是“確保未來基本能源需求能夠得到滿足的能力,既可以通過在經(jīng)濟(jì)上可接受的條件下使用充足的國(guó)內(nèi)資源,也可以作為戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備來維持,還可以通過調(diào)用可獲取和穩(wěn)定的外部資源,在適當(dāng)情況下補(bǔ)充戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備”。大多數(shù)歐洲國(guó)家沒有足夠的國(guó)內(nèi)能源;因此,他們需要進(jìn)口能源,因此供應(yīng)安全對(duì)他們來說至關(guān)重要。從各個(gè)供應(yīng)商購(gòu)買能源是能源安全的最佳方式,以防止可能的供應(yīng)沖擊。能源供應(yīng)商的需求安全是與買家達(dá)成的長(zhǎng)期協(xié)議,減少價(jià)格波動(dòng),增加買家數(shù)量,應(yīng)對(duì)其他供應(yīng)商的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。
Since in the late 2000s, there are some problems between the EU and Russia on the security of energy. In the early 2000s in spite of increasing energy prices Gazprom, which state energy company of Russia, offered acceptable prices, hence the EU did long term contracts with this Russian company. Furthermore, the EU wanted Russia to adopt liberal economic rules in the energy trade of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). However, in 2009, Russia declared that it would not be a party to this agreement. This attitude of Russia against ETC was disputing the liberal market principles of the West. Moreover, in the late 2000s energy prices decreased because of the shale revolution and the global economic crisis. The EU aimed to renegotiate its long-term agreements with Gazprom because cheaper gas was available in the energy market. Prices in these contracts were renegotiated and made improvements for purchasers. However, this situation created an unclear circumstance over the continuation of the contracts (Siddi, 2018, p.1557).
自2000年代末以來,歐盟和俄羅斯在能源安全方面存在一些問題。2000年代初,盡管俄羅斯國(guó)有能源公司俄羅斯天然氣工業(yè)股份公司的能源價(jià)格不斷上漲,但該公司提供了可接受的價(jià)格,因此歐盟與這家俄羅斯公司簽訂了長(zhǎng)期合同。此外,歐盟希望俄羅斯在《能源憲章條約》的能源貿(mào)易中采用自由的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)則。然而,2009年,俄羅斯宣布它不會(huì)成為這項(xiàng)協(xié)議的締約國(guó)。俄羅斯反對(duì)ETC的態(tài)度與西方的自由市場(chǎng)原則存在爭(zhēng)議。此外,在2000年代末,由于頁巖革命和全球經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī),能源價(jià)格下降。歐盟旨在重新談判與俄羅斯天然氣工業(yè)股份公司的長(zhǎng)期協(xié)議,因?yàn)槟茉词袌?chǎng)上有更便宜的天然氣。對(duì)這些合同中的價(jià)格進(jìn)行了重新談判,并對(duì)買方進(jìn)行了改進(jìn)。然而,這種情況對(duì)合同的延續(xù)造成了不明確的情況。
Many pipeline projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Nabucco pipeline, which enable to import gas from Caspian basin countries without Russia, has been supported by the EU. By doing so, the EU is trying to counter Russia’s power and impact in the region. In addition, the EU enforces regulatory legislation to control relations with energy suppliers. For instance, the EU restricts the ownership of energy distribution assets by the non-EU providers via the so-called `Gazprom clause` (Siddi, 2018, p.1558).
許多管道項(xiàng)目,如南部天然氣走廊和納布科管道,都得到了歐盟的支持,這些項(xiàng)目可以從里海盆地國(guó)家進(jìn)口天然氣,而不需要俄羅斯。通過這樣做,歐盟試圖對(duì)抗俄羅斯在該地區(qū)的力量和影響力。此外,歐盟執(zhí)行監(jiān)管立法,以控制與能源供應(yīng)商的關(guān)系。例如,歐盟通過所謂的“Gazprom條款”限制非歐盟供應(yīng)商對(duì)能源分配資產(chǎn)的所有權(quán)。
3. Role of Turkey 土耳其的作用
Turkey aims to be an important energy corridor using the geopolitical position (Aykin, Tache and Karaman, 2017, p.294). Turkey located between oil and gas rich countries and region that greatest energy-consuming in the west. In addition, Turkey has two important straits: Bosphorus and Dardanelle. Approximately 3% of the world’s oil trade is shipping through the Turkish straits (Ersen and Celikpala, 2019, p.586).
土耳其的目標(biāo)是利用地緣政治地位成為一個(gè)重要的能源走廊。土耳其位于石油和天然氣豐富的國(guó)家和西部能源消耗最大的地區(qū)之間。此外,土耳其還有兩個(gè)重要海峽:博斯普魯斯海峽和達(dá)達(dá)尼爾海峽。全球約3%的石油貿(mào)易是通過土耳其海峽運(yùn)輸?shù)摹?/p>
Turkey’s significance for the energy security of the EU has been accepted many times by EU officials and EU documents. The EU stated in EU’s Energy Security Strategy of 2014 that the Southern Corridor project is very important for the EU’s energy security. Turkey appears as an alternative energy route for the EU against Russia (Koukoudakis, 2017, p.111-112). The southern gas corridor is very important for Europe’s energy diversification goals. This fourth gas corridor seeks to transport the Caspian and Gulf gas to Europe via Turkey. Due to the sanctions imposed on Tehran, Europe cannot transfer from Iran. The EU, therefore, focuses more on the gas coming from the Caspian basin (Winrow, 2013, p.150).
土耳其對(duì)歐盟能源安全的重要性已多次被歐盟官員和歐盟文件接受。歐盟在2014年的《能源安全戰(zhàn)略》中表示,南部走廊項(xiàng)目對(duì)歐盟的能源安全非常重要。土耳其似乎是歐盟對(duì)抗俄羅斯的替代能源路線。南部天然氣走廊對(duì)于歐洲的能源多樣化目標(biāo)非常重要。第四條天然氣走廊旨在通過土耳其將里海和海灣天然氣輸送到歐洲。由于對(duì)德黑蘭實(shí)施的制裁,歐洲無法從伊朗轉(zhuǎn)移。因此,歐盟更加關(guān)注來自里海盆地的天然氣。
The North-South corridor and the East-West corridor are two main lines in order to transfer natural gas to Europe via Turkey. The Blue Stream pipeline, which opened in 2003, is providing gas flow from under of Black Sea from Russia to Samsung which is a Turkish port. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline which transports Azerbaijan’s oil to Turkey opened in 2006. Thanks to this line, Caspian oil transfers without shipping via Russia. In 2007, the Caspian gas line was connected to Greece with Turkey–Greece interconnector (ITG), and this was the first time that Caspian gas reached Europe without passing through Russia. As a result of connecting the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which opened in 2018, with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which expected to open in 2020, Azerbaijan gas will transport to Europe via Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Italy (Koukoudakis, 2017, p.112-113). TANAP will supply the EU with 16 billion cubic meters of gas per year at the first step, following years, this will be increased to 20 billion cubic meters. This project might be a vital importance Turkey be a significant energy corridor (Guo, Huang and Wu, 2019, p.833).
南北走廊和東西走廊是通過土耳其向歐洲輸送天然氣的兩條干線。藍(lán)溪管道于2003年開通,從黑海海底向土耳其港口三星提供天然氣。巴庫(kù)-第比利斯-杰伊漢管道于2006年開通,向土耳其輸送阿塞拜疆石油。由于這條線路,里海石油無需通過俄羅斯運(yùn)輸。2007年,里海天然氣管道通過土耳其-希臘互連器連接到希臘,這是里海天然氣首次不經(jīng)俄羅斯而到達(dá)歐洲。由于2018年開通的跨安納托利亞管道與預(yù)計(jì)于2020年開通的亞得里亞海管道的連接,阿塞拜疆天然氣將通過土耳其、希臘、阿爾巴尼亞和意大利運(yùn)往歐洲,這將增加到200億立方米。該項(xiàng)目可能是土耳其重要的能源走廊。
One of the Gazprom’s two important projects Turk Stream to supply gas to Europe will pass Turkish territory while bypassing Ukraine. Turk Stream was designed as an alternative to the Trans-Balkan pipeline through Ukraine. This project was announced by Vladimir Putin who is Russian President in December 2014. South Stream has found to be against EU legislation and this project replaced it. As a bridge EU–Russia gas trade, Turkey’s strategic position will strengthen through this pipeline. Moreover, Turkey is the second-biggest gas importer of Russia and Russia will provide the gas flow to Turkey through this project without Ukraine (Siddi, 2018, p.1561-1562). When the project completed, it is estimated to shipping 31.5 bcm per year and half of this amount to the Turkish domestic market and the other half to the European purchaser (Guo, Huang and Wu, 2019, p. 834). However, the completion of the project is connected directly to the good relationship between Turkey and Russia. The project ceased after a Russian warplane was shot down by Turkish jets in 2015. After the failed coup attempt in Turkey on July 2015, Turkey tended from its western allies to Eastern countries and increasing Russian-Turkish cooperation accelerated the Turkish Stream process (Siddi, 2018, p.1562-1563).
俄羅斯天然氣工業(yè)股份公司(Gazprom)向歐洲供應(yīng)天然氣的兩個(gè)重要項(xiàng)目之一“土耳其河”將繞過烏克蘭,經(jīng)過土耳其領(lǐng)土。Turk Stream被設(shè)計(jì)為穿越烏克蘭的跨巴爾干管道的替代方案。該項(xiàng)目由俄羅斯總統(tǒng)弗拉基米爾·普京于2014年12月宣布。南溪被發(fā)現(xiàn)違反歐盟立法,該項(xiàng)目取代了它。作為歐盟與俄羅斯天然氣貿(mào)易的橋梁,土耳其的戰(zhàn)略地位將通過這條管道得到加強(qiáng)。此外,土耳其是俄羅斯的第二大天然氣進(jìn)口國(guó),俄羅斯將通過該項(xiàng)目向土耳其提供天然氣流量,而無需烏克蘭。項(xiàng)目完成后,預(yù)計(jì)每年將運(yùn)送315億立方米天然氣,其中一半運(yùn)往土耳其國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng),另一半運(yùn)往歐洲買家。然而,該項(xiàng)目的完成與土耳其和俄羅斯之間的良好關(guān)系直接相關(guān)。2015年,一架俄羅斯戰(zhàn)機(jī)被土耳其戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)擊落,該項(xiàng)目停止。2015年7月土耳其政變失敗后,土耳其從西方盟友轉(zhuǎn)向東方國(guó)家,俄土合作的增加加速了土耳其流進(jìn)程。
Conclusion 結(jié)論
After the crisis in Ukraine, it became clear how vulnerable the EU’s energy security. Reducing dependency on Russia and diversifying resources might minimize this vulnerability. Although the EU does not have an economic problem in the energy field, scarcity of resources and routes pose the main problem. Furthermore, if the Union acts jointly within itself, it can react faster to external threats and maximize energy efficiency. However, such a union is not yet achieved. It is obvious that Turk Stream, TANAP and TAP projects are very important for the EU. Nevertheless, The EU should not only depend on Turkey as an energy supply line, but also it should think to create new energy routes which cross over the Mediterranean. The EU should express to countries which have the ability energy supply that joining the EU market will provide not only energy security but also business opportunities, so peace and prosperity in the region will increase.
烏克蘭危機(jī)發(fā)生后,歐盟的能源安全變得十分脆弱。減少對(duì)俄羅斯的依賴和資源多樣化可能會(huì)最大限度地減少這種脆弱性。盡管歐盟在能源領(lǐng)域沒有經(jīng)濟(jì)問題,但資源和路線的短缺是主要問題。此外,如果歐盟內(nèi)部聯(lián)合行動(dòng),它可以更快地應(yīng)對(duì)外部威脅,并最大限度地提高能源效率。然而,這種聯(lián)合尚未實(shí)現(xiàn)。很明顯,Turk Stream、TANAP和TAP項(xiàng)目對(duì)歐盟非常重要。盡管如此,歐盟不僅應(yīng)該依賴土耳其作為能源供應(yīng)線,還應(yīng)該考慮建立橫跨地中海的新能源路線。歐盟應(yīng)向有能力提供能源的國(guó)家表示,加入歐盟市場(chǎng)不僅將提供能源安全,還將提供商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì),因此該地區(qū)的和平與繁榮將得到加強(qiáng)。
Turkey has determined objectives to be the energy corridor and it is implementing single-mindedly these. Turkey may be an indispensable energy rota for the EU, if it uses properly its strategic location. There is no another possible alternative for the EU to reach Caspian basin gas. This trump in the hands of Turkey may be very important to become an EU member. One of the biggest problems of the EU’s security of energy supply is regional crises. There are well historical ties with countries in the Caspian region to Turkey and Turkey may implement soft power through these ties when needed. Turkey should be on good relations with the region countries, the EU and Russia to realize its goals. However, Turkey has problems with the EU on the Cyprus issue and despite it is in cooperation with Russia on the Syria crisis and buying S-400 missile system, the relations are very sensitive. Despite all adversities, to develop cooperation between Turkey and the EU would bring numerous advantages for two sides.
Paper范文得出結(jié)論:土耳其已確定了能源走廊的目標(biāo),并正在一心一意地實(shí)施這些目標(biāo)。如果土耳其正確利用其戰(zhàn)略位置,它可能是歐盟不可或缺的能源輪值主席國(guó)。對(duì)于歐盟來說,沒有其他可能的替代方案來輸送里海盆地的天然氣。土耳其手中的這個(gè)特朗普對(duì)于成為歐盟成員國(guó)可能非常重要。歐盟能源供應(yīng)安全的最大問題之一是地區(qū)危機(jī)。土耳其與里海地區(qū)國(guó)家有著良好的歷史聯(lián)系,土耳其可以在需要時(shí)通過這些聯(lián)系實(shí)施軟實(shí)力。土耳其應(yīng)該與該地區(qū)國(guó)家、歐盟和俄羅斯保持良好關(guān)系,以實(shí)現(xiàn)其目標(biāo)。然而,土耳其在塞浦路斯問題上與歐盟存在問題,盡管土耳其在敘利亞危機(jī)和購(gòu)買S-400導(dǎo)彈系統(tǒng)方面與俄羅斯合作,但兩國(guó)關(guān)系非常敏感。盡管面臨種種困難,但土耳其與歐盟發(fā)展合作將為雙方帶來諸多好處。本站提供各國(guó)各專業(yè)留學(xué)生paper代寫或?qū)懽髦笇?dǎo)服務(wù),如有需要可咨詢本平臺(tái)。
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